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As the Post-Soviet World Turns: Coalition Politics in Ukraine's Verkhovna Rada from 2006-Present

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Chapter 1: Introduction

In any multi-party system, the coalitions become an essential part of the political process. Not just the formation of a coalition, but its maintenance and termination as well, are all extremely important parts a political system's activities, with consequences extending beyond the activities of the coalition and impacting the future successes and political influence of the parties within the system. In fact, all three phases of a coalition's life cycle – the formation phase, the maintenance phase, and the termination phase – are all interconnected, and therefore, when examining one phase of a coalition, it is necessary to take in to account the other two phases for completeness.

The goal of this study is to evaluate Bruce Bueno de Mesquita's theory of coalition behaviour, as detailed in his 1971 book *Strategy Risk and Personality in Coalition Politics: The Case of India*, in the context of present-day Ukraine. This theory takes an iterative approach to coalition behaviour, making the assumption that an actor's actions in one particular coalition have an impact on that actor's future political influence, as well as its potential for membership in new, later coalitions. Because of this assumption, extreme behaviour is not generally in the best interest of the actor, if it wants to preserve its options for future coalition membership. Cooperative behaviour – consistently sacrificing individual goals in favour of the collective coalition ones – is not the best strategy for actors who are looking to increase their long-term political influence; however, it is the best strategy for actors who are looking to maximise their chances of inclusion in future coalitions. Consistent competitive behaviour, on the other hand, is the best strategy for maximising short-term gains, but can quickly lead to exclusion from coalitions, minimising the amount of long-term gains to be had. According to Bueno de Mesquita, the ideal strategy is the so-called mixed strategy, a mixture of competitiveness and cooperativeness.

The theory set forth in Chapter 2 makes it possible to evaluate the ideal strategies that actors should follow in order to maximise their long-term or short-term benefits in a specific situation. However, it also makes it possible to establish why some actors may choose to apply a different strategy in a particular coalition situation. This is done by creating a model to link an actor's need for achievement with its risk-taking preferences. The resulting model manages to explain the effects that certain strategies have on the fortunes of an actor, as well as the strategic preferences of party elites.

The Ukrainian context was chosen for both its similarities to - and differences from - the Indian context that Bueno de Mesquita uses in his analysis. Like India in the 1960s and 1970s, Ukraine is a fairly young multi-party democracy, which is still establishing its political system at this point, as evidenced by the number of changes that its electoral laws have undergone during the last decade. Unlike Bueno de Mesquita's Indian case, this paper will only investigate coalitions that occur on the national level in the Verkhovna Rada, providing minimal coverage of regional and local politics. However, it will include a brief mention of the effects of regionalism on national politics in Ukraine, as to a large extent, voters elect candidates along a southwest to northeast axis.

The Ukrainian political system is further distinguished by the nature of its political parties. Unlike India, which, by the time of Bueno de Mesquita's research, already had a number of established political parties, Ukrainian political parties tend to have relatively short life spans. Many Ukrainian political parties are "disposable" parties, established by some powerful group of individuals in order to pursue their goals during a specific election cycle. Most parties are structured around one powerful individual, who serves as the party's ideological or formal leader. Thus the political fortunes of the parties are, to a certain extent, tied to the political (and in some cases, literal) fortunes of these individuals. Within the decision-making hierarchy of the

party structure, these individuals often exercise a very large degree of influence in directing the party's programmes and behaviour.

By looking at several Ukrainian coalitions that have occurred in the last decade, this paper aims to establish general patterns of coalition politics in Ukraine, using Bueno de Mesquita's theory to do so. Ideally, these patterns would be independent of particular parties and leaders and their idiosyncrasies; however, this might be difficult in Ukraine, given the prominent role that party leaders play within the party.

Using data about the political aspirations and opinions of Ukrainian party elites, collected via anonymous online surveys modelled on the one used by Bueno de Mesquita, this paper will attempt to explain the outcomes of elections in Ukraine without exploring complicating factors, such as regional and linguistic effects on voters. Rather than looking at these factors as potential reasons for election results, this paper considers the outcomes of elections in the context of the strategic inclinations of party elites, the differences in their needs for achievement, and finally, the organisational abilities of each party. That is, this paper seeks to establish the proportion of the variance in the success of Ukrainian political parties since 2006 that can be explained by the different styles of their respective party elites.

The data obtained through the surveys will be used explicitly to test the six hypotheses that form the foundation of Bueno de Mesquita's coalition theory. These hypotheses are as follows:

(a) The most likely coalitions to form are minimal winning ones, followed by medium-sized ones, with large coalitions being the least likely to occur;

(b) Redistributive benefits of the coalition are distributed without regard to the size of the actor receiving them;

(c) The share of redistributive benefits that an actor receives is proportional to the degree that the actor pursues a mixed strategy. At the same time, the share of benefits received

decreases as the actor increasingly pursues either a purely mixed or purely competitive strategy;

(d) Actors with a high need for achievement prefer the mixed strategy;

(e) Actors with a high need for achievement are more likely to maximise their long-term gains in terms of political influence than actors with a low need for achievement;

(f) The actors most likely to maximise their political influence in the long term are those who have the organisational capability to appropriately apply the mixed strategy and are willing to take the risks necessary for the successful application of the mixed strategy, because these actors are most likely to maximise their share of the redistributive benefits within a coalition.

Furthermore, some attempts are made to justify the apparent inconsistencies that exist between the different goals of Ukrainian political parties (including participation in the Orange Revolution) and their willingness to enter into coalition governments together, such as the case of the SPU in 2006. This study aims to demonstrate that the appeal of the benefits of coalition membership, such as patronage, exposure, and position in the government, is great enough for some parties to disregard what might be considered ideological opinions. Additionally, it will be demonstrated that ideology plays only a minor role in Ukrainian political life (and consequently, coalition formation).

Finally, this study seeks to establish whether theory developed about the behaviour of Western-style political systems can be applied to the new post-Soviet democracies. Although these new political systems may seem similar to the established ones on their faces, different histories and expectations of government behaviour may result in a political environment that does not fit neatly into established political theory.

Chapter 2: A General Theory of Coalition Behaviour & Literature Review

Why do coalitions form? What conditions encourage a party to form a coalition? What factors cause coalitions to become unstable? What circumstances cause a party to prefer one coalition to another? Although these are all valid questions, their answers can vary largely depending on the idiosyncrasies of each specific political situation to which they would be applicable. This chapter will explore the relationships amongst skills, strategies, goals, and personalities of party elites, and their effects on the lives of coalitions.

A coalition is defined as a group of players (in this case, politicians) who have at least one goal in common and agree to combine resources in pursuit of that goal (Brams, Jones, & Kilgour, Forming Stable Coalitions: The Process Matters, 2003, p. 3). A coalition is a "winning" coalition if the members are able to achieve their shared goal; conversely, a "losing" coalition is one where the members are not able to achieve their shared goal. The existence of a losing coalition does not necessitate the existence of a winning coalition, and vice versa.

Theories of coalitions require that several critical assumptions be made about goals of the players. Goals can either be established through observing the behaviour of the players, a strategy known as "revealed preference", or by making assumptions as to what their preferences are most likely to be, a technique known as "posited preference" (Riker & Ordeshook, 1973). For the purposes of this paper, posited preference is used in the discussion of coalition theory.

The most important assumption made about the players' goals is that "all political parties want to maximise their long-term influence of the decision-making process", where "long-term" indicates that actors may be able to convert resources to influence during the last in a series of decision-making situations. (Bueno de Mesquita, 1975, p. 3). While actors may have other goals that they consider more important than this one, they must behave as if this is their priority for

a few reasons. In order to successfully achieve other goals a political party must maintain enough control over the decision making process in order to influence its final outcome. Thus, a political party must be able to sustain its capacity to exert some form of influence in the long-term as a requirement for it to achieve other goals. (Bueno de Mesquita, 1975)

Coalitions have a life-cycle consisting of three phases: the formation stage, the maintenance stage, and the termination stage, each of which require a different strategy form the participants, as they have different risks and benefits associated with them (Bueno de Mesquita, 1975, p. 5). In the formation stage, coalitions act as a dependent variable, with the most important factor being the environment in which it is formed – its size, members, etc. During the maintenance stage, coalitions become either independent variables (where they are considered in relation to things like the changing sizes or attitudes of political parties), or intervening variables (when they are considered in relation to things like how being a member of a specific coalition at a specific time influences a party's future) (Bueno de Mesquita, 1975).

Conditions encouraging coalition formation

Political coalitions emerge as a part of a competition for limited resources, starting with seats in parliament but later extending to things such as the law-making process, or budget allocation. In the case of parliamentary coalitions, winning would be defined as controlling some number of seats or other resource necessary to the fulfilment of its goals.

Conditions do not always necessitate the formation of parliamentary coalitions. For example, if a single political party wins enough seats to independently possess a parliamentary majority, then it is unlikely that this party would join a coalition, since it has no reason to do so because it can control the decision-making process and reap the benefits of the outcomes without having to share them. In the case that a single party has enough resources to influence the decision-making process in its favour, then it is not in its best interest to join a coalition.

However, the more likely case in a multi-party system is that no one party wins a majority of seats, therefore requiring the creation of a parliamentary coalition. In the event that a coalition is a winning coalition, then its members control the allocation of the resources at stake, shutting out the actors outside of the coalition. Thus, in the case where there is no single entity in control, it is more advantages for actors to get a shared portion of the benefits won by a winning coalition, than it is for an actor to be outside of the coalition and at best, receive nothing (and at worst, lose resources that the winning coalition may require (Bueno de Mesquita, 1975, p. 4).

When determining if membership in a coalition is to its advantage, actors must first consider the advantages and disadvantages of their options, including the evaluation of potential coalition partners. In a coalition, members are frequently forced to make compromises; therefore, it is important that actors prioritise their objectives and know which ones they are willing to sacrifice in pursuit of other goals, or the potential future advantage. Actors must also look at the skill and resources of their potential partners, as it must negotiate with them internally during the course of the coalition, and these internal relationships will influence the outcome of decisions (Bueno de Mesquita, 1975, p. 5). For example, in some cases, it is advantageous for an actor to have partners who are less skilful negotiators in a coalition, particularly when those partners might possess disparate goals. In the most extreme case, an actor may be better off on its own than in a coalition where the losses it must suffer to be a member are greater than the gain – in this case, the actor may utilise the option to leave a coalition at any time if continued membership is not to its benefit (Riker W. H., 1962, p. 39).

The episodic condition

The starting point for coalition theory is the episodic condition, which refers to the fact that a "coalition's effects are restricted to the short-term distribution of benefits to all the winners, usually at the expense of the losers" (Bueno de Mesquita, 1975, p. 7). This arises as a direct

consequence of a number of assumptions made in coalition theory. Although many theories of coalitions focus on different reasons for the behaviour of actors, they all tend to share one assumption, regarding competitions: winning coalition's members will cooperate amongst themselves in order to secure their win while directing their activities against opposing groups with whom they are in competition (Brams, Positive Coalition Theory: The Relationship Between Postulated Goals and Derived Behavior, 1973, p. 16).

Actors may compete against each other during the formation phase of the coalition, but during the maintenance phase of a winning coalition, they work together in pursuit of winnable resources, at the same time insuring that non-members do not get any of these resources. Actors can only receive a portion of benefits that is proportional to their contribution to the initial resource pool of the coalition, a condition known as the parity norm.

Because the episodic condition states that coalitions are restricted to the short term, it allows for coalition members to have divergent long-term interests. The episodic condition is a necessary requirement in coalition theory, as the very existence of multiple political parties implies that there are differing goals and interests, yet they are required to ally themselves in a coalition in order to achieve anything. However, if a coalition is to be a winning environment for its members, then the episodic condition also means that a coalition's actions are limited to those which do not negatively affect the long-term interests of any of its members.

Thus, several constraints must be applied to the allocation of gains in order for the episodic condition to remain value. One potential constraint is that the distribution of payoffs must be exactly proportional to the contributions of the coalition members to collective resources that allow the coalition to win. However, this first constraint places further limitations on actors, elimination the possibility of side payments, making it largely unrealistic given the nature of politics. If side payments were to be permitted, then actors could derive benefit from two

sources: its share of benefits from membership in a winning coalition, plus some share of benefits from its partner as payment for membership in its coalition. This payment would be offered by a partner who would otherwise be a loser – membership in a winning coalition with little or no benefit derived is still preferable to being in a losing position, either alone or as a member of a coalition. However, the second source of payment raises an issue, namely that it conflicts with the episodic condition, as one coalition member receiving a much larger resource share means that it has increased its influence to a greater extent than its partners and will have an advantage over them in future situations. (Bueno de Mesquita, 1975, pp. 9,170) (Riker & Ordeshook, 1973, pp. 163-170)

The other possible constraint is that some of the resources obtained from the victory are fleeting and cannot be applied to future coalition formation situations. This constraint allows for some members of the winning coalition to receive larger shares of benefits than their partners, so long as these benefits are not incorporated into the resources of the winners and will not be used in later political contests. The possibility of this constraint derives from the fact that different benefits will have different levels of desirability for different coalition members. However, the most important factor is that the disproportionate allocation of resources can have no impact on future situations; otherwise it would be in violation of the episodic condition.

The net effect of the constraints on allocation is that, under the episodic condition, members of a winning coalition are unable to use the resources that they have gained to their advantage in future negotiations. Furthermore, it limits the pursuit of power of coalition members within the coalition, restricting their actions to the pursuit of shorter-term objectives, for example, fulfilling the coalitions' common goals. Coalition members may increase their power overall, but this must be done in proportion to the increase of power by other coalition members. An increase of power by one member at the expense of others would be a violation of the episodic condition. (Bueno de Mesquita, 1975, p. 10)

However, the presence of the parity norm means that the episodic condition will inherently be violated. If a member of a winning coalition enters a coalition and makes the largest contribution to the resource pool, then it will receive the lion's share of benefits from the victory, even if the benefits are distributed according to the parity norm. When these benefits serve to increase the power of their recipient, then their distribution is a zero-sum game. This introduces the element of intra-coalition competition.

When considering coalition formation, there are different theoretical approaches on the issue. Some focus on "the ability of individual actors to convert losing coalitions to winning coalitions" (Bueno de Mesquita, 1975, p. 13). This is known as the pivotal power school of thought. The other approach, which also focuses on payment allocation, is known as the minimum resource approach. The minimum resource approach considers the impact that the initial conditions – most particularly the allocation of power – have on coalition formation.

Pivotal power theorists, such as Shapley and Shubik (1953, 1954), believe that actors wish to maximise their share of the payoff; however, in this case, the payoff would be in proportion to the pivot power of the actor, rather than its initial contribution to the shared resource pool. Shapley and Shubik use a concept called "pivot power" to evaluate an actor's status. Pivot power is calculated by taking the number of potential winning coalitions of which an actor would be a member, and then evaluating which of them would be come losing coalitions were the actor to withdraw. The more potential winning coalitions that an actor can cause to fail by withdrawing, the greater its pivotal power is calculated to be.

The minimum resource approach introduces the idea of minimal winning coalitions – those coalitions that are just large enough to win under the rules but no larger. Both Riker and

Gamson share the hypothesis that minimal winning coalitions are the most likely to form; however, they argue in support of it through rather different approaches.

The issue of side payments once again comes into play in Riker's theory. Riker states that coalition formation occurs within a zero-sum environment – that is, a situation in which the gains of those receiving a disproportionately large share of the resources are balanced out by the sacrifices of their fellow coalition members who receive smaller shares than should be allocated under the parity norm. Thus, a minimal winning coalition – defined as the smallest possible that is able to win under the rules of coalition formation – can win the most benefits, as there is the largest pool of losers for it to draw resources from. Riker explains that when side payments are permitted in order to persuade actors into a coalition, members of a minimal winning coalition derive the most benefit than any other possible winning coalition. So, in the case that side payments are allowed, the most likely scenario is that a minimal winning coalition will occur, a situation known as the size principle. (Riker W. H., 1962, pp. 32-46)

Gamson also concluded that a minimal winning coalition was the most likely to form, however, his justification was rather different. He argued that under the parity norm, the best way for an actor to maximise its payoff was to contribute the largest portion to the resource pool, thus guaranteeing the largest share of benefits. Since optimal maximisation of resources can occur only in a minimal winning coalition, these would have the most appeal to actors and therefore be the most likely to form. Gamson also examined the role played by ideology in the coalition formation process; however, his results indicated that this played a far lesser role than other factors, such as the amount of bargaining involved in forming a coalition. (Gamson, 1961)

That is, if there exists a system with three actors (*A*, *B*, and *C*), where the definition of a winning coalition remains the same as in the previous example, and *A* controls more resources than *B*, which controls more resources than *C*, but *B+C* control more resources than *A*. Under Riker and

Gamson, the most likely outcome of this scenario is that *B* and *C* form a coalition, although all two-actor combinations of *A, B* and *C* are possible winning coalitions. The justification for this is as follows: *B* prefers to be in a coalition with *C* because it contributes the most resources, and therefore will receive the largest share of the benefits according to the parity norm. *C* prefers to be in a coalition with *B* because the proportion of resources initially in the pool is closer to being evenly divided than if *C* were in a coalition with *A*, therefore it will also receive a larger share of the payoff in a coalition with *B* than in a coalition with *A*. Because both *B* and *C* would prefer to be in a coalition with each other rather than with *A*, *BC* is the most likely coalition to form.

Michener, et al. empirically prove that both pivotal power theory and minimum resource theory have their shortcomings, and neither is able to wholly explain a full range of coalition situations. In addition to theories focusing on maximising payoffs, coalition theory is also home to range of theories on the influence of social interaction amongst actors on coalition formation, both in conjunction with payoff maximisation and on its own.

Caplow (1956, 1959) and Chertkoff (1967, 1971) both look at coalition formation from the combined social interaction-payoff maximisation point of view, with Chertkoff's model being an improved revision on Caplow's model.

Caplow's model examined a coalition formation situation with three actors, like the one given in the example above. This model rests on several assumptions: (1) stronger coalition members can and will attempt to control weaker coalition members; (2) coalition members would rather control other members than be controlled themselves; (3) actors would prefer to be controlled in a winning coalition than lose overall; (4) the influence of the coalition is equal to the combined influence of its members (Bueno de Mesquita, 1975, p. 14) (Caplow, 1959, p. 488).

In the triad example described above, Caplow hypothesises that the most likely coalitions to form would be either *AC* or *BC*. Under Caplow's assumptions, both *A* and *C* are indifferent actors. As the actor with the least amount of resources available, *C* will end up being controlled by *A* or *B* regardless of which coalition it joins. As the most powerful actor, *A* will always be able to control its coalition partner, regardless of whether it happens to be *B* or *C*. Yet, *B* is not an indifferent actor. For *B*, joining a winning coalition with *A* would mean that, while it wins, it is not in control; thus this option is extremely undesirable for *B*. However, if *B* were to join a coalition with *C*, then it would have the opportunity to both be in a winning coalition and be in control.

Caplow is unable to predict the relative likelihood of either *AC* or *BC* forming; this is where Chertkoff's improvements come into play. Chertkoff introduces probabilities along these lines: *A* and *C* are wholly indifferent potential coalition partners, so $p_A(B)$, the probability of *A* accepting a coalition with *B* is 0.5, as is $p_A(C)$, the probability of *A* accepting a coalition with *C*. Along those lines, $p_C(A)$, the probability of *C* accepting a coalition with *A* is 0.5, as is $p_C(B)$, the probability of C accepting a coalition with B. However, because of *B*'s distinct preferences, $p_B(C)$, the probability of *B* accepting a coalition with C, its preferred outcome, is 1.0, and $p_B(A)$, the probability of *B* accepting a coalition with *A*, is most undesirable outcome, is 0. This results in the following calculations (where p(*XY*) is the probability that coalition *XY* forms):

Table 1 Probabilities of coalition formation

p(*AB*)	$p_A(B)p_B(A)$	(0.5)(0)	0
p(*AC*)	$p_A(C)p_C(A)$	(0.5)(0.5)	0.25
p(*BC*)	$p_B(C)p_C(B)$	(1.0)(0.5)	0.5
p(no coalition)	$p_A(B)\ p_B(C)\ p_C(A)$	(0.5)(1.0)(0.5)	0.25

Chertkoff's approach is the best approximation of reality of the methods discussed so far, because he takes into account the case where no coalition at all forms. Because Chertkoff considers the probability of each event occurring, his theory can be extended to iterative

coalition formation situations where each individual situation is considered as an independent event. However, it still does not account for the redistribution of resources or the alteration of actor preferences in between coalition formation episodes.

Finally, there is the research into the social interaction motivations of coalition formation, which was described by Gamson (1964). Gamson looks at coalition formation as an iterative game, where actors' behaviour in one round affects behaviour in future rounds, as they can learn from their experiences in previous round and use this knowledge to influence the outcomes of successive rounds. Because the game is played as a number of successive rounds, players become concerned with how they are viewed by their peers, preferring to negotiate as little as possible in order to better their position. The result of this is that models which look at coalition formation episodes as a series of wholly independent experiences tend to become inaccurate in behavioural predictions over long periods of time. Ultimately, this anti-competitive approach results in coalitions forming amongst actors with similar sizes, as payment distribution in this case is more or less equal under the parity norm (Bueno de Mesquita, 1975, pp. 17-18).

The differences in iterative situations as opposed to independent situations have several implications for actors. First, in iterative situations, actors looking at how best to achieve their long-term strategy must look at their goals over a number of iterations. It is not necessary for them to maximise their payoff in every iteration in order to maximise their payoff at the end of a series of iterations, and they can alter their behaviour accordingly. Following from this, much research (Gamson (1964), Hoffman, Festinger, Lawrence (1954)) establishes that competitive behaviour is best for establishing an advantage in the short-term, however, cooperative behaviour results in long-term advantage.

These theories work well under the episodic condition, where resource distribution remains constant. But what if resources are redistributed in successive iterations? For the episodic condition, applying the necessary constraints previously discussed means that some members of the winning coalition must be willing to sacrifice some of their long-term goals and influence in favour of the short-term shared goals of the coalition, a fairly unreasonable proposition as long-term goals should take precedence over short-term ones. Furthermore, the episodic condition fails to take into account the ability of actors to learn from previous and current coalition experiences, instead treating each coalition formation in a series as an independent event. Thus, it is a better option to use the redistributive condition, which provides for a more realistic approach to coalition formation, instead of the episodic condition.

The redistributive condition

The redistributive condition is a more realistic improvement upon the episodic condition. First, the set of conditions required by the redistributive condition are more relaxed than those required by the episodic condition. It also provides a fuller theory of coalition behaviour than the episodic condition, encompassing the life span of the coalition rather than just the formation stage.

Like the episodic condition, the redistributive condition also allows for coalition members to have incompatible goals. However, it takes a different approach to the distribution of payoffs, looking at it from an iterative perspective. The episodic condition requires that winning coalition members benefit equally from victories, with benefits distributed according to the parity norm in such a way that no coalition member gains an advantage over the others. Under the redistributive coalition, this requirement does not exist. For example, given a triad coalition *ABC*, consisting of members *A*, *B*, and *C*, *ABC* pursues a policy supported by *A*, which believes that supporting this policy will help it in future elections. *B* goes along with *A* in supporting the

policy, even though it does not believe that it will derive any benefit from it. *C* supports the policy simply because its coalition partners support it, and *C* does not feel that it will suffer any loss by supporting it.

However, politics is a zero-sum game, and the increased success of one coalition member necessitates the decreased success of another. In the situation described above, *A* is the only party to derive any benefit from the policy, and in future competitive situations, *A* can use its increased status against *B* and *C*, who derived no benefit from the policy and therefore incurred losses to *A*'s gains. Thus, we can see that the effects of a benefit on a coalition are not necessarily the same for all of its members.

The redistributive condition also takes a more liberal view of what constitutes benefits to a coalition, choosing to look at them as a currency that can be converted to or somehow used to obtain viable resources, rather than explicitly requiring them to be resources in the first place. This has implications for the long-term strategies and goals of coalition members. If benefits are not necessarily resources, than simply maximising the share of explicit resources won in a given situation does not necessarily guarantee that this actor will manage to increase its influence in the long run, as some other actor may have received a larger share of benefits that can later be converted to resources. For example, a party may concede to the demands of a coalition partner for some larger share of resources for use in the short-term in exchange for redistributive benefits that the party can use to further its long-term goes. (Bueno de Mesquita, 1975, p. 20)

The redistributive condition makes a number of improvements upon the episodic condition. First, by introducing the idea that the distribution of benefits is not constant across a number of coalition situations, the redistributive condition allows for competition within the coalition, as partners jockey for future influence. During the coalition maintenance stage, coalition partners look not just to achieve the shared goals of the coalition, but also at improving their own lot at

the expense of their coalition partners as well as the losers. While the episodic condition allows actors to behave competitively during the coalition formation stage, the redistributive allows (but does not require) this behaviour during both the coalition formation and maintenance stages; yet, it also provides for the case that they may also behave cooperatively during the maintenance stage. (Bueno de Mesquita, 1975, p. 21)

The redistributive condition also addresses the coalition termination stage, covering the entire life cycle of the coalition. The episodic condition states that a coalition may come to an end only when the shared goal – the catalyst behind its formation – has been fulfilled, or continued membership in the coalition becomes too expensive for its members to derive benefit from it due to changes in external circumstances. However, the redistributive coalition allows for a wider range of coalition termination situations by changing the reasons for coalition membership in the first place. It argues that, rather than having the shared coalition goals be the reason for the formation of the coalition, it is possible for actors to join a coalition in order to receive redistributive benefits, rather than to fulfil shared goals, which act as a screen to their true motivations (Bueno de Mesquita, 1975, p. 21). It follows from this that a coalition member may leave the coalition if it believes that it can receive a bigger portion of the pie elsewhere, terminating the coalition solely due to selfish motivations rather than because the goals have been fulfilled or membership has become costly or impractical.

Ultimately, the strength of the redistributive condition lies in its flexibility. Because it allows for more types of behaviour than the episodic condition without excluding the possibility of the behaviours described by the episodic condition, it can be applied to the entire life cycle of a coalition, rather than just the formation stage. The redistributive coalition covers a greater range of actors and their motivations than the episodic condition, looking at coalition formation as an iterative process and the ways in which actors may attempt to achieve both short-term and long-term goals under different circumstances.

Coalition formation under the redistributive and episodic conditions

In his theory on the redistributive condition, Bueno de Mesquita provides several hypotheses about the behaviour of actors under the condition. The first of these hypotheses is that: "Coalition formation behaviour in redistributive situations is the same as coalition formation behaviour in episodic situations. That is, minimal coalitions are most likely to form, with intermediate-sized coalitions being next most likely, and with very large winning coalitions being least likely to form" (1975, p. 26).

The proof of this hypothesis lies in the examination of coalition formation under both the episodic condition and the redistributive condition (Bueno de Mesquita, 1975, pp. 22-26). The episodic literature is unable to distinguish between the effects of an actor's size and its strategy (competitive vs. cooperative) on its inclusion in a winning coalition. This is due to the probable distribution of benefits according to the parity norm.

The largest actor in the coalition, which is guaranteed the largest share of winning benefits under the parity norm, has three options when joining a coalition. First, it can join a coalition where it both maximises its share of the payoff in comparison with the other members, and where it also fulfils its goals in relation to the absolute payoff. This coalition would represent the minimal winning coalition, where the largest actor receives the largest share of benefits within the coalition and overall, since this coalition maximises the benefits that its members receive.

The second type of coalition that the largest actor could join would be one where it still maximises its share of the payoff in comparison with the other members, but does not maximise its potential share of the payoff overall. In this coalition, the difference in size between the largest actor and the other coalition members is not as great as in the first example; therefore its overall share of the benefits is less, although it still receives a larger payoff than its partners.

In the third time of coalition, the largest member receives a suboptimal share of both the relative and absolute benefits. This type of coalition can only occur where the largest member is not the largest actor in the system, as the only way that the largest member can receive a suboptimal share of the payoff is if some other actor contributes more to the set of shared resources.

The net effect of the parity norm on the largest actor is that coalitions including the largest actor in the system become increasingly rare in successive coalition formation situations. Simply due to its size (and regardless of its strategy), if benefits are distributed according to the parity norm, this actor will receive the greatest share. As its size increases, it is less desirable for other, smaller actors to enter into a coalition with the largest actor as they will be unable to maximise their benefits in such a coalition. This means that it is to the largest actor's advantage to behave competitively so that it may maximise is share of the benefits for the duration of time where it is considered an acceptable coalition partner.

Due to the fact that the identity of the largest actor can change in successive iterations as a consequence of the redistribution of benefits, the redistributive condition enables differentiation between the effects of an actor's size and its strategy on its potential as a future coalition partner. Like the coalitions formed under the episodic conditions, smaller actors may maximise their share of the payoff by excluding the largest actor from the winning coalition. However, after several iterations, one of these smaller actors may have gained enough benefits to become the largest actor.

Under the redistributive condition, the strategy of an actor plays a large role in determining its acceptability as a coalition partner. In order to optimise its payoff over a number of iterations until it is ready to achieve its long-term goals and can risk exclusion from future coalitions, an

actor must behave competitively enough that it remains a relatively large actor within the system and can receive a large share of the benefits, but not so competitively that it becomes the largest actor and is no longer an acceptable partner for future coalitions. The redistributive condition does not apply the parity norm to the distribution of benefits, leaving this actor free to increase its resources slowly over a number of iterations by manipulating the payoffs during the maintenance so that it remains large, but not the largest actor in the system. Thus, although strategy is the most important element during the maintenance phase, an actor's size is the most influential factor during the coalition phase, as it determines is acceptability as a coalition partner.

Actor size and distribution of benefits

Bueno de Mesquita's second hypothesis concerns the size of actors and the distribution of benefits of a winning coalition: "There is no association between the distribution of redistributive payoffs in a winning coalition and the size of the actors of the winning coalition" ((1975, p. 26). This hypothesis arises from the competitive behaviour that occurs during the coalition maintenance phase (Bueno de Mesquita, 1975, pp. 26-30). Under the redistributive condition, benefits are not distributed according to the parity norm; rather, as discussed above, coalition members jockey to maximise their long-term influence by becoming or remaining large, but not the largest, actor in the system.

Actors in a winning presumably seek to maximise their individual long-term influence, regardless of the shared goals of the winning coalition, which serve as a smoke screen over the long-term goals. However, if this desire to maximise long-term status at the expense of others in the system is shared by multiple members of the coalition, then an obvious conflict exists.

In seeking to maximise their influence, actors take a number of risks – most notably, that they maximise their influence too soon, becoming the largest actor in the system, and are likely

excluded from future coalitions. It is in an actor's best interest not to maximise its benefits until it is sure that they can be converted into political currency of some sort, for example increased electoral appeal or legislative influence. These situations usually occur at the end of a series of iterations, such as immediately before elections or modifications to the rules of the system.

Actors have several options by which they can seek to fulfil their long-term goals. First, actors have the option to take resources away from those actors not included in the coalition, while at the same time preventing their fellow coalition members from doing the same. In this situation, the actor may maximise its benefits by remaining in the coalition long enough to obtain as many resources as it can from the losing actors, then terminating the coalition and attempting to form a new one, which would redistribute the benefits and provide the winning actor with a new set of losers from which to draw resources. The actor could behave in a continuously exploitative pattern, switching coalitions when they are no longer of use, and slowly increasing its influence at the expense of the losers and its former coalition partners. However, the actor runs the risk of other actors noticing the pattern of its behaviour and excluding it from future coalitions. Thus, actors should not seek to maximise their payoff after each iteration, which would push the tolerance limits of their partners and lead to their potential exclusion in the future.

Actors also have the option to behave in a cooperative manner, taking no more than their fair share of the resources available. However, this strategy stunts the growth of smaller actors, as it would force them to maintain the proportions in place at the beginning of the series of iterations. The most effective strategy for an actor to pursue regarding the distribution of redistributive benefits is a mixture of competition and cooperation. Through this strategy, actors can increase their influence at a slower rate within the tolerance limits of their rivals and coalition partners.. The mixed strategy allows an actor to increase its influence while still maintaining its acceptability as a coalition partner by tempering its size and influence until the final iteration in the series, when it can maximise these with no future consequences.

Strategic behaviour in coalitions: the redistributive equation

Before coming to Bueno de Mesquita's third hypothesis, on the influence of strategy and the distribution of redistributive benefits, it is first necessary to further discuss the specific strategies available to the actors, as well as their consequences.

Competitive actors seek to maximise their long-term political influence. They are therefore more concerned with obtaining benefits that will be *politically* useful to them in the future than actually achieving their *policy* goals. Because of the ambition present in competitive actors, they tend to have extremely low tolerance levels for other competitive behaviour, making coalitions involving them rather unstable (Bueno de Mesquita, 1975, p. 31).

A purely competitive strategy is the riskiest option available to actors. While an actor may be able to rapidly increase its influence through competition, it can easily run afoul of the tolerance limits of other actors in the system by overreaching its hand. Because competitive actors routinely demand a larger share of benefits than they are entitled to, they require sacrifices to be made on the part of their partners. When these sacrifices become too great for the partners to remain in the coalition, then they will seek to terminate it. As a result, the competitive actor may be forced out of the coalition before it has had the opportunity to convert its payoff to resources; therefore, the competitive strategy will frequently only help an actor in the short term.

Cooperative actors will also seek to remain in a winning coalition for as long as possible in order to maximise their benefits; however, unlike competitive actors, they tend to focus on fulfilling their short-term policy goals and maximising their long-term influence, rather than seeking to capitalise on fulfilling *political* goals in the short term. As a result of this approach, cooperative actors have a higher tolerance limit than competitive actors and will acquiesce to competitive

demands as long as they are not disproportionate enough or frequent enough to violate the tolerance limit of the cooperative actor.

Unlike competitive actors, which always seek to maximise their benefits, cooperative actors are happy to apply the parity norm to the distribution of redistributive benefits, rather than endure a bargaining process. The cooperative approach hinges on the idea that an actor who is able to remain in a winning coalition, continuously receiving a small share of benefits, over an extended period of time will better maximise its long-term influence than a competitive actor who is in the coalition for a shorter time but receives disproportionately large payoffs when benefits are distributed (Bueno de Mesquita, 1975, p. 30).

The third strategy available to the actor – the mixed strategy – affords the advantage of remaining in the coalition for an extended period of time if it tempers its competitive instincts, while still enabling it to occasionally demand a larger share of redistributive benefits within the tolerance limits of its partners. The mixed strategy requires that the actor convince its partners that occasionally giving it a larger portion of the benefits in exchange for, say, its support on a policy issue is necessary for them to continue to enjoy the benefits of coalition membership. An actor pursing a mixed strategy requires that at least some of its partners have high tolerance levels, so that they will not balk at its demands, but it is also more sensitive to the tolerance levels of its partners than the competitive actor and is willing to work within these.

This leads to Bueno de Mesquita's third hypothesis about coalition behaviour: "An actor's share of a coalition's redistributive benefits decreases as the actor moves toward a purely cooperative or a purely competitive strategy. An actor's share of the redistributive benefits is positively associated with the degree to which the actor pursues a mixed strategy" (1975, p. 36). This is demonstrated through a formula used to determine payoffs given a number of variables, the redistributive equation:

$$p_i(Y)_n = (p(D_i)_n)\frac{X_j - \sum_{t=n-x}^{n-1}\left[\left(K_j\right)(f_i(D)_t)\right]}{X_j}$$

with the maximum $\sum_{t=n-x}^{n-1}\left[\left(K_j\right)(f_i(D)_t)\right] = X_j$. This equation indicates the probability p that actor *i* will receive a disproportionately large share of redistributive benefits *Y* from some other actor *j* at time *n*. The probability that the demand is issued by *i* and not some other actor (aside from *j*) in the system is denoted by $p(D_i)_n$, and *X* is the number of previous demands made by *i* that *j* takes into consideration when reviewing the latest demand. $f_i(D)_t$ represents the frequency that *i* makes a demand *D* at time *t* of *Y* resources. K_j represents the erosion of *j*'s tolerance based on previous demands made by *i*, starting at 0 and increasing to 1 as *X* is approached and *j*'s tolerance is pushed. (Bueno de Mesquita, 1975, pp. 32-33)

In short, the redistributive equation means that the likelihood of *i*'s demand for a disproportionately large share of benefits at time *n* is equal to the probability that the demand is issued by *i*, reduced by *j*'s decrease in tolerance from *i*'s previous demands. Because the redistributive equation takes into account the probability that a particular demand comes from *i* and not some other actor in the system, it indicates that actor *i* is best off in a coalition where other actors are not making competitive demands at the same time, as it increases the likelihood of *j* acquiescing to *i*'s request.

The redistributive equation allows an actor *i* to evaluate the likelihood that actor *j* will grant its request, given a number of other variables. Clearly, it is advantageous for *i* select a partner with a low value for X_j in order to maximise the number of (not necessarily consecutive) requests that *i* can make over the life of a coalition, as a low *X* value indicates that *j* has a high tolerance level and a short memory.

Empirical literature is able to suggest realistic values for *X*. As Bueno de Mesquita explains, "players tend to respond to each other in terms of the strategic response that they received from their opponent in the immediately preceding iteration" (1975, p. 34). That is, if an actor had previously made a competitive request, then the responding actor was likely to respond in a similar fashion, and vice versa. For the redistributive question, this implies that X has a "short memory", and only covers the previous iteration – thus it will always be 1 or 0.

Now that a test value for *X* has been determined, it is possible to run a simulation of a hypothetical coalition situation consisting of three actors using different strategies, using the redistributive coalition to predict the likelihood of an actor receiving extra benefits in a particular iteration. In this simulation, the cooperative actor never makes any demands for extra payoff, the competitive actor always demands extra payoffs, and the mixed strategist alternates between demanding extra payoffs and not.

Table 2 Coalition simulation based on different strategies

Iteration	**Cooperative**		**Competitive**		**Mixed**	
t_n	*f(D)*	*p(Y)*	*f(D)*	*p(Y)*	*f(D)*	*p(Y)*
t_1	0	0	1	0.5	1	0.5
t_2	0	0	1	0	0	0
t_3	0	0	1	0	1	0.5
t_4	0	0	1	0	0	0
t_5	0	0	1	0	1	0.5
t_6	0	0	1	0	0	0
$\overline{p(Y)}$	-	0	-	0.083	-	0.25

This table indicates that although the purely competitive strategy leads to the largest share of benefits in the first iteration, continued pursuit of it in successive iterations does not lead to increased benefits. The cooperative strategy, meanwhile, suffers from "nothing ventured, nothing gained" – because no demand is ever made, no additional payoff ever occurs. Finally, the mixed strategy results in the best average *p(Y)* over successive iterations. From this table of

sample calculations involving the redistributive equation, it is immediately obvious that the mixed strategy is the most effective one for maximising long-term benefits.

One of the shortcomings of the redistributive equation is that it fails to take into account the cases where actors may wish to deviate from their preferred strategy for some reason. When choosing a strategy to pursue in a particular iteration, an actor must assess the probability that the strategy will result in its desired outcome, whether that outcome is to remain in the winning coalition, to win a disproportionately large share of the benefits, or to do both.

In order to evaluate which strategy is preferred by the actor in a given situation, Riker and Ordeshook (1973) use the following preference equation:

$$\sum_{a=1}^{r}\left[p_q(O_a) - p_s(O_a)\right]U(O_a) + \left(U_q - U_s\right) \; where \; s \neq q$$

In this equation, q and s represent different strategies, for which p_q and p_s are the probabilities that these respective strategies will result in a successful outcome O_a. $U(O_a)$ represents the value that the actor places on O_a, and U_q and U_s are the values that the actor gives each of the strategies available. The utility of the outcomes represents the order in which the actor prefers the outcomes, and the utility of the available strategies represents the order in which the actor prefers the strategies. In the case that the preference equation sums to zero, the actor does not prefer one strategy to the either; if it is positive, then strategy q is preferred, and if it is negative, strategy s is preferred. The preference equation demonstrates that it is not possible to determine an actor's preferred strategy based simply on the redistributive equation; rather, any assessment must also take into account the utility of a strategy and the probability that the strategy will result in the desired outcome.

The probability variables used in the preference equation can easily be determined by using the redistributive equation over a number of iterations. Because $f(D)$ remains close to zero for the cooperative approach over a number of situations, it is clear that the cooperative strategy is the most effective if an actor's goal is simply to remain a member of a winning coalition for the long-term. However, for this same reason, the cooperative strategy is the least effective one if the goal is to acquire an optimal level of redistributive benefits. In this case, pursuing a competitive strategy can result in achieving this early on; but continuing to pursue this strategy over a number of iterations means that an actor will quickly reach the tolerance levels of its coalition partners and be unable to repeat its successes in future iterations.

The individual probabilities of an actor remaining in a coalition for a long time ($p(L)$) and receiving a disproportionately large share of redistributive benefits ($p(D)$) can be determined by multiplying the two individual probabilities together. In the case of the cooperative strategy, $p(L)$ approaches one, but $p(D)$ remains close to zero after a number of iterations. For the cooperative strategy, $p(L)p(D)$ evaluates to zero, making it unlikely that this actor will successfully achieve both outcomes. In the case of the competitive strategy, $p(L)$ goes to zero fairly quickly, and $p(D)$ is 1 after the first iteration but goes to zero soon after as the tolerance limits of the coalition partners are reached. So, $p(L)p(D)$ for the competitive actor also goes to zero. Finally, in the case of the mixed strategist, $p(L)$ and $p(D)$ both fluctuate between 0 and 1; thus $p(L)p(D)$ also fluctuates between 0 and 1 for the mixed strategist.

Given these results, the following strategic preference ordering can be determined based on the goals of the actor:

Table 3 Strategic preference ordering

Max. longevity	**Max. benefits at time *n***	**Joint**
Cooperative	Competitive || mixed	Mixed
Mixed	Competitive || mixed	Cooperative || competitive
Competitive	Cooperative	Cooperative || competitive

Although the mixed strategy seems preferable to actor wishing to maximise both its share of the redistributive benefits and its longevity in the coalition, an actor's choice will also be influenced by its preference for risk-taking (Bueno de Mesquita, 1975, p. 39). It is easy for an actor to make assessments in situations when the risk of failure is either very high or very low. Situations in which the risk is fairly similar, however, are more complicated.

Situations with a high risk of failure typically yield a higher payoff than situations with a low risk of failure. For example, say a person has €1,000 that they wish to increase. This person could place the money in a savings account, a low risk investment with a guarantee of success. He/she could also put the money into a mutual fund, a moderately risky option with a relatively high expectation of success – or the money could be could be put on the trifecta in a horse race, a very risky opportunity with the potential for the largest payoff in the shortest amount of time.

Translating this example back into the different strategies available to political actors, we can see that those actors who wish to optimise the certainty of a particular outcome would be most inclined to choose either the cooperative strategy or the competitive strategy, depending on their particular goals. If the goal is to maximise longevity in a coalition, then the cooperative strategy is preferable; if it is to maximise payoff in the short-term, then the competitive strategy is most effective. The mutual fund investors – those who prefer a moderate risk in return for a moderate reward – would be most likely to prefer the mixed strategy.

Because the mixed strategy involves the actor tailoring its behaviour to the tolerance levels of its coalition partner, it is the only one in which the actor can actively manipulate the outcome of the distribution of benefits. Long-term success in pursuing the joint outcome using a purely competitive strategy would only occur if the competitive actor's coalition partners had extremely high tolerance levels and were consistently willing to concede benefits, a matter of luck rather than skill. Similarly, long-term success in pursuing the joint outcome using the

cooperative strategy would also be a matter of luck, as the cooperative actor's coalition partners would be unlikely to give it a disproportionately large share of the redistributive benefits if it did not request them.

Risk-taking and need for achievement

Bueno de Mesquita's fourth and fifth hypotheses are both related to actors' need for achievement – where need for achievement is defined as an actor's "desire to compete against a standard of excellence" – as it affects strategic choice (1975, p. 41).

The fourth hypothesis states that: "The higher an actor's need for achievement, the greater the tendency for the actor to prefer the mixed strategy" (Bueno de Mesquita, 1975, p. 42). This is not to say that a mixed strategist necessarily has a high need for achievement, but a high need for achievement favours the mixed strategy. Because the mixed strategy is the only one which allows an actor any control over outcomes, it is the only one which allows the evaluation of need for achievement with ease, as different actors with differing levels of skill in assessing their partners' tolerance levels and timing their competitive and cooperative acts will experience differing levels of success.

This hypothesis makes it possible to evaluate the utility values for use in the preference equation. With this knowledge, it is possible to fill in values for the variables in the preference equation to draw some conclusions. In this simulation drawn from Bueno de Mesquita (1975), *mx* = mixed strategy, *co* = cooperative strategy, and *cp* = competitive strategy; l = longevity, b = benefits, and j = joint outcome. If an actor has a high need for achievement, then it will attach a greater utility to the mixed strategy ($U_{mx} > U_{cp} = U_{co}$). By the same token, actors with a low need for achievement will attach a greater utility to the competitive and cooperative strategies ($U_{cp} = U_{co} > U_{mx}$). As discussed previously, if an actor's preferred outcome is longevity, then it will prefer the mixed strategy over the competitive strategy, and the cooperative strategy overall,

so: $p_{co}(O_l) > p_{mx}(O_l) > p_{cp}(O_l)$. If an actor's goal is to maximise its short-term benefits, then it will most likely achieve success with either the competitive or mixed strategy over the cooperative one: $p_{cp}(O_b) \geq p_{mx}(O_b) > p_{co}(O_b)$. Finally, if an actor is interested in a successful joint outcome, it is more likely to achieve success with the mixed outcome over the competitive or cooperative strategy: $p_{mx}(O_j) > p_{cp}(O_j) = p_{co}(O_j)$.

Filling these into the preference equation, we generate the following tables, the first of which uses values for utilities where the need for achievement is low, and the second of which uses values of the utilities where the need for achievement is high.

Table 4 Strategic preference and low need for achievement

Probabilities		Utilities (low need for achievement)		Strategic preference
$[p_{co}(O_l) - p_{cp}(O_l)]U_l > 0$	+	$(U_{co} - U_{cp}) = 0$	=	Cooperative
$[p_{co}(O_l) - p_{mx}(O_l)]U_l > 0$	+	$(U_{co} - U_{mx}) > 0$	=	Cooperative
$[p_{mx}(O_l) - p_{cp}(O_l)]U_l > 0$	+	$(U_{mx} - U_{cp}) < 0$	=	Undetermined
$[p_{co}(O_b) - p_{cp}(O_b)]U_b < 0$	+	$(U_{co} - U_{cp}) = 0$	=	Competitive
$[p_{co}(O_b) - p_{mx}(O_b)]U_b < 0$	+	$(U_{co} - U_{mx}) > 0$	=	Undetermined
$[p_{mx}(O_b) - p_{cp}(O_b)]U_b > 0$	+	$(U_{mx} - U_{cp}) < 0$	=	Undetermined
$[p_{co}(O_j) - p_{cp}(O_j)]U_j \to 0$	+	$(U_{co} - U_{cp}) = 0$	=	No preference
$[p_{co}(O_j) - p_{mx}(O_j)]U_j < 0$	+	$(U_{co} - U_{mx}) > 0$	=	Undetermined
$[p_{mx}(O_j) - p_{cp}(O_j)]U_j > 0$	+	$(U_{mx} - U_{cp}) < 0$	=	Undetermined

Table 5 Strategic preference and high need for achievement

Probabilities		Utilities (high need for achievement)		Strategic preference
$[p_{co}(O_l) - p_{cp}(O_l)]U_l > 0$	+	$(U_{co} - U_{cp}) = 0$	=	Cooperative
$[p_{co}(O_l) - p_{mx}(O_l)]U_l > 0$	+	$(U_{co} - U_{mx}) < 0$	=	Undetermined
$[p_{mx}(O_l) - p_{cp}(O_l)]U_l > 0$	+	$(U_{mx} - U_{cp}) > 0$	=	Mixed
$[p_{co}(O_b) - p_{cp}(O_b)]U_b < 0$	+	$(U_{co} - U_{cp}) = 0$	=	Competitive
$[p_{co}(O_b) - p_{mx}(O_b)]U_b < 0$	+	$(U_{co} - U_{mx}) < 0$	=	Mixed
$[p_{mx}(O_b) - p_{cp}(O_b)]U_b > 0$	+	$(U_{mx} - U_{cp}) > 0$	=	Mixed
$[p_{co}(O_j) - p_{cp}(O_j)]U_j \to 0$	+	$(U_{co} - U_{cp}) = 0$	=	No preference
$[p_{co}(O_j) - p_{mx}(O_j)]U_j < 0$	+	$(U_{co} - U_{mx}) < 0$	=	Mixed
$[p_{mx}(O_j) - p_{cp}(O_j)]U_j > 0$	+	$(U_{mx} - U_{cp}) > 0$	=	Mixed

(Bueno de Mesquita, 1975, p. 43)

One of the obvious conclusions that these tables show is that for an actor with a high need for achievement, if the mixed strategy is an option, then it is the generally preferable one (in five out of the size cases). For this type of actor, the mixed strategy is preferable for both obtaining benefits in the short term and the joint outcome, maximising both benefits and longevity. Meanwhile, for actors with a low need for achievement, preferences are far less clear, with the exception of the longevity case, where they prefer to cooperate.

These calculations lead to Bueno de Mesquita's fifth hypothesis: "Political actors with a high need for achievement are more likely than political actors with a low need for achievement to succeed in maximising their long-term influence over the decision-making process" (1975, p. 44). Because actors with a low need for achievement do not have a clear-cut strategy for the joint case, thus their behaviour is inconsistent. Since actors with a high need for achievement consistently pursue the mixed strategy in order to manipulate outcomes in their favour, it is likely that their gradually increasing benefits will lead to greater success than the actors with a low need for achievement, who are being shut out of the receipt of benefits over time.

Organisation and success

As previously mentioned, pursuing the mixed strategy involves a certain amount of calculation on the part of the actor. In order for the mixed strategy to be successful, the actor must correctly assess the tolerance levels of its coalition partners, as well as the time that it needs to convert benefits into its resource base (so that it can ensure that it does so before being excluded from future deals) and its own ability to carry out any threats that it makes (for example, leaving the coalition if its demands are not met).

This requirement that an actor wishing to successfully pursue a mixed strategy must make a number of organisational considerations results in Bueno de Mesquita's sixth and final

hypothesis: "Political actors predisposed to pursue the mixed strategy, with the organisational capabilities to identify the optimal application of that strategy, and with the motivation predispositions to take the risks involve in the optimal application of that strategy are most likely to acquire a disproportionately large share of the redistributive benefits in their coalitions. Consequently, they are most likely to increase their political influence in the long run" (1975, p. 45). In other words, an actor must be able to correctly evaluate its own capabilities, as well as the likely responses to situations by fellow coalition partners if it is to achieve its goals.

Coalition termination

Up to this point, the primary focus of this chapter has been on the coalition formation and maintenance phases, which are typically home to the majority of the actions yielding benefits. However, the coalition termination phase can also serve as a useful tool for an actor with a high need for achievement – an actor willing to take risks.

As previously mentioned, there may come a point in a coalition where an actor has maximised its benefits within the coalition and is no longer able to improve its position through continued membership in the coalition. If the actor controls enough resources to make it an essential part of the coalition, it can withdraw its membership and force the collapse of the coalition. Because withdrawing from the coalition means that the actor is no longer guaranteed a share of benefits of any size, this behaviour is quite risky.

If the actor can negotiate a place in a new winning coalition that excludes some of its previous partners, then it will benefit from terminating the previous coalition, as it can take some of the benefits awarded to its previous partners who are excluded from the new coalition as the spoils of victory. However, repeatedly causing coalition termination is a type of competitive behaviour,

and an actor who pursues this strategy over a long time may find that it reaches the tolerance limits of the other actors in the system very quickly. Like the mixed strategy, "coalition hopping" requires a great deal of skill from the actor, as it must once again examine the tolerance limits of its partners and potential partners while gauging its own ability to secure in a place in a winning coalition after each iteration.

Summary

The coalition theory used in this paper is organised around the redistributive equation and its associated hypotheses. Under the redistributive equation, benefits secured from coalition victories are not ephemeral; rather they are a form of political currency which is converted to become a part of the winning actor's resource base and can be used again in future coalition situations. We have seen that small actors are the most likely to be included in winning coalitions, followed by medium-sized actors. The largest actor in a system is the least likely to be included in a winning coalition simply because it will require a greater share of benefits than the other actors due to their size, resulting in the others being unable to optimise their gains. However, under the redistributive equation, benefits are not distributed according to some set formula, such as the parity norm, which is applied to benefits distributed under the episodic condition. Rather, an actor's strategy (cooperative, competitive, or mixed) serves as the determinant for the size of the share of benefits that the actor will receive. The most effective strategy for an actor to pursue if it wishes to maximise both the length of its membership in the coalition and its share of the benefits is the mixed strategy, which involves alternating the cooperative approach (pursuing shared coalition goals) with the competitive approach (demanding a disproportionately large share of the redistributive benefits). Actors pursuing the mixed strategy are able to manipulate the distribution of benefits most successfully if they are able to accurately assess the tolerance limits of their coalition partners, as well as its own credibility, and time its competitive requests in order to maximise the chance that its partners

will acquiesce to them. An actor with a high need for achievement is most likely to pursue the mixed approach, because such an actor has a greater propensity for riskier behaviour in which the outcome is less than certain if the potential rewards are high, as opposed to an actor with a low need for achievement, who prefers a more certain outcome. Finally, an actor's particular strategy during each phase of the coalition is largely determined by willingness to engage in risk taking behaviour. The actor most likely to maximise its gains is one willing to engage in a moderate degree of risk in order to optimise the outcome after several coalition situation iterations.

Chapter 3: The Ukrainian Context, 2002-present

Why Ukraine?

Over the last 20 years, as Ukraine has struggled to find its way as an independent country, it has experienced a constantly evolving range of political climates – turmoil clearly visible in the fact that there have been 12 different individuals who have served as Prime Minister under 14 different governments. As Sarah Birch points out, prior to 1998, Ukraine did not possess "anything resembling a national party system…capable of mediating between the preferences of the electorate and the structure of parliament" (2000, p. 15).

After adopting a new constitution in 1996, Ukraine proceeded on its path of reform, adopting a new electoral law in 1997 to be applied to the 1998 parliamentary elections. The electoral law came in direct response to the 1994 elections, which was fraught with issues as well as the realisation that further action would be required to strengthen Ukraine's party system. Several rounds of balloting led to an ineffectual parliament, referred to as the *boloto* or swamp in Ukrainian, where no party came close to achieving a majority, and the largest group of members were independents. Because many districts did not achieve the required fifty per cent voter turnout, many seats remained unfilled for the duration of the term. (D'Anieri, 2007)

The 1998 electoral law replaced the 1994 electoral system of single member districts (SMDs) with a semi-proportional system, largely inspired by Russia's nearly identical system and designed to lessen the number of independents present, thereby strengthening the party system. The new method split the 450 seats in the Verkhovna Rada fifty-fifty between proportional representation and single member seats. The proportional seats were to be allotted using the largest remainders method amongst parties on a national ballot that had achieved at least 4% of the vote, and the SMD seats were filled via simple plurality with no threshold whatsoever. (Birch, 2000)

By the 2002 election, which was held under the 1997 electoral law, political parties had begun to consolidate as today's set of prominent political actors began to win positions of power. In the 1998 elections, eight parties won both proportional and SMD seats, and sixteen won SMD seats (as well as 114 independents); in 2002, seven parties won both proportional and SMD seats, but just four won only in SMDs, and the number of independents was reduced to ninety-four. (see Appendix I for more detailed election results)

Yet still, the process of establishing a party system in Ukraine was proceeding very slowly. In the wake of the Orange Revolution in 2004, when the results of the presidential election were contested and Viktor Yushchenko was installed as president, conditions were finally right for Ukraine to switch to a fully proportional system for parliamentary elections, which would further force party consolidation due to the four per cent threshold required for a party to gain a seat in the Verkhovna Rada. Because the previous president, Leonid Kuchma, was a member of the Party of Regions, which drew the majority of its support from SMDs in the 2002 elections, Kuchma had been strongly opposed to modifying the electoral law in favour of a fully proportional system (D'Anieri, 2007, p. 162). Without Kuchma's opposition, however, Ukraine was able to make the switch to a full PR system, which, as D'Anieri states "favours the large parties at the expense of the smaller ones, and assists those with stronger party identification and with the most prominent notables" (D'Anieri, 2007, p. 163)

This last point is especially salient in the case of Ukraine, where political parties typically revolve around illustrious characters such as Yushchenko or the iconic Yulia Tymoshenko. Indeed, the former German ambassador to Ukraine Dietmar Studemann said in a 2009 interview: "The most important question in Ukraine remains personalities, posts, whereas platforms are viewed as minor matters...Parties in the proper meaning of this word do not exist in your country so far" (Ukrainian News, 2009). In a similar vein, Taras Kuzio remarks that party leaders in Ukraine "treat [the parties] as their private property and refuse to step down

from leadership positions" (Kuzio, Ukraine: Muddling Along, 2011, p. 342). The leader of a political party in Ukraine plays a much more visibly significant role in his/her party's fortunes, even in parliamentary elections, than one would typically expect to see in a western-style representative democracy. Political parties are also inextricably linked with business, either arising "to supplement influential business groups, or, if they emerged at the very beginning of independence, they sought partnerships with big business" (Osipian & Osipian, 2006, p. 501).

After the implementation of the pure PR system with a three per cent threshold and five year term length, the number of parties in parliament was reduced to five – however, the issue of forming a majority coalition was still largely at stake, as no party had managed to achieve a constitutional majority of 300 members. The initial expectation was that Yushchenko would appoint Tymoshenko to the post of prime minister, as they had agreed during the Orange Revolution, thus creating an "orange coalition" with the Our Ukraine Bloc (NU), Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc (BYuT), and Socialist Party of Ukraine (SPU). Due to Yushchenko's objections to this, Ukraine proceeded to enter a period of infighting and instability, which eventually resulted in the formation of the Anti-Crisis coalition, comprised of the Party of Regions, SPU, and Communist Party of Ukraine (KPU). This coalition was in direct opposition to the president, however, and snap elections were held in 2007.

The 2007 elections resulted in five parties still managing to obtain seats in the Verkhovna Rada, but the intervening years leading up to the present have seen a number of changes in the parliamentary composition, including the collapse of another government, the creation of a new parliamentary faction, Reforms for the Future, and a number of party defections, after the repeal of the so-called "Imperative Mandate", a 2004 constitutional amendment that prohibited switching factions, in 2010.

Meanwhile, in the build-up to the 2012 parliamentary elections, changes have been made to Ukraine's electoral laws once again. In November 2011, parliament passed a law re-establishing the mixed proportional-SMD system for parliamentary elections in the spirit of the 1997 electoral law, although with a 5% threshold for parties this time. Additionally, pre-election blocs, which currently hold approximately 40% of the seats in the Verkhovna Rada, have been banned (Interfax Ukraine, 2011). This new law has potentially huge consequences for the political composition of Ukraine after the 2012 elections that are scheduled for 28 October, particularly the parties currently in opposition, which are all blocs.

The constantly evolving political climate in Ukraine during the last 10 years makes it a fascinating case study for coalition formation. Ukraine has a mixture of national and regional parties, all vying for greater stature as its party system develops, as well as a number of external factors that greatly influence internal politics. Moreover, the case of Ukraine may provide insight as to how well previously established political theory, such as that regarding coalitions, may be applied to post-Soviet states, or whether previous behaviours and attitudes are entrenched enough that new theory would need to be developed or previous theory adapted to suit these situations.

The Actors

The number of active political parties in Ukraine is quite large – forty-five parties and twenty blocs put forth candidates in 2006 and 2007 – and especially as a country which is still establishing its party system, political parties are born and die with relative frequency. For the purposes of simplicity and relevance, I will be covering political blocs or parties which have been present in some manifestation in the Verkhovna Rada from 2002 to the present, namely: Party of Regions, which holds the current parliamentary majority, Bloc Yulia Tymoshenko-Baktivshchyna (BYuT), Our Ukraine-People's Self-Defence Bloc (NUNS), the Communist Party of

Ukraine (KPU), and Bloc Lytvyn. Other parties, blocs, or factions present, such as the SPU and new Reforms for the Future faction will receive a cursory mention in context.

Party of Regions (PR)

The 2002 parliamentary elections saw the emergence of a bloc known as "For United Ukraine", which got 11.77% of the PR vote nationally but managed to obtain a total of 101 seats in the Verkhovna Rada, second only to Our Ukraine. For United Ukraine drew most of its support from the southern and eastern regions of Ukraine, receiving 36.83% of the PR vote and winning 19 out of 22 SMDs in Donetsk, Ukraine's most eastern (and most populous) oblast'. (Central Election Commission of Ukraine, 2006)

The Donbas (Donestk Basin) region of Ukraine, consisting primarily of the Donetsk Oblast' and Luhansk Oblast', is one of Ukraine's most economically significant areas, greatly affecting its internal and national politics. During the 1990s, regional politics in the Donbas were fractured due to both internal competition between apparatchiks and up-and-coming oligarchs over economic assets, as well as competition with the Dnipropetrovsk elite for the gas market, particularly transit contracts for Russian gas. The Donbas elite operated under the maxim "politics is made in Kyiv, and money is made in the Donbas" for most of this time, preferring to remain unaffiliated with a party lest it injure business interests (Zimmer & Haran, 2008, p. 555).

In the mid-1990s, the Donetsk elite managed to establish a party known as the Party of Regional Revival of Ukraine, which was headed by Donetsk's mayor, Volodymyr Rybak, planting the seeds for the growth of national political power from the region. Described as an "oligarchic party", the main purpose of political involvement by the Donetsk elite was "to reap the economic benefits associated with holding office" (Bader, 2009, p. 112). Yet although the Party of Regional Revival of Ukraine enjoyed the support of the Donetsk elite, it was far from the only viable party in the region. During the 1998 parliamentary elections, the Party of Regional Revival won just one SMD.

However, the 1997 election law had its intended effect on several parties – in 2000-2001, five smaller parties announced their willingness to combine forces and merge into the Party of Regions of Ukraine, which first appeared in the Verkhovna Rada in March 2001 as a new faction called "Regions of Ukraine". The parties involved in the merger were the Party of Regional Revival of Ukraine, the Party of Labour (also Donetsk-based, and favoured by former senior Soviet bureaucrats), the Party for a Beautiful Ukraine (led by Leonid Chernovetsky, mayor of Kyiv), and finally, the All-Ukrainian Party of Pensioners. Mykola Azarov, the prime minister at present and then the State Tax Administration director (RIA Novosti, 2010), was elected the head of the new party, which promptly joined the pro-Kuchma For United Ukraine (ZYU) bloc in time for the 2002 parliamentary elections.

After the electoral success enjoyed by ZYU, especially in the Donbas, during the parliamentary elections on 31 March 2002, the bloc itself was short-lived. By the time that the parliamentary session began in September, it had ceased to exist, and the Party of Regions continued to act in parliament as the Regions of Ukraine faction and joined the majority coalition.

Around this time, the Party of Regions began to enjoy success in higher levels of government. In 1997, Viktor Yanukovych, a former transportation executive, was appointed Governor (Head of the Administration) of the Donetsk Oblast', and he concurrently assumed a position as Head of the Council of Donetsk Oblast' in 1999. He and his supporters managed to gain a monopoly over local political positions through the use of *nomenklatura*, and in the 1999 presidential election, they supported the winning candidate, Kuchma, who won unexpectedly in Donetsk, allowing them to increase their national influence. Thus, in December 2001, a Party of Regions member, Ihor Yusho, was appointed to the Kinakh cabinet as the new Minister of Finance (Interfax Ukraine, 2001). (Zimmer & Haran, 2008)

Following Party of Regions' success in the 2002 parliamentary elections, they continued to receive appointments to powerful positions, culminating with the election of Yanukovych as Prime Minister of Ukraine. This placed him perfectly to become the Party of Regions' presidential candidate for the 2004 race.

A discussion of the formation of the Party of Regions would be incomplete without a mention of Rinat Akhmetov. Akhmetov, one of Ukraine's wealthiest oligarchs, is a notable supporter of the Party of Regions, initially as a financial backer, but more recently as a deputy in the Verkhovna Rada. Akhmetov's financial connections to the Party of Regions are widely acknowledged. In a diplomatic cable from 2006, stemming from an interview with Volodymyr Horbulin, a policy adviser to then-President Yushchenko, the Party of Regions is described as being "a regional bloc [representing] large enterprises and financial structures of the Donbas region", which was "most notable for its inclusion of criminal and anti-democracy figures" and "enjoyed deep pockets" thanks to the contributions of Akhmetov (US Embassy Kyiv, 2006). Amongst the newer parties in the Verkhovna Rada, the Party of Regions enjoys the distinction of possibly being able to outlast the political career of its leader, Yanukovych, and survive so long as Akhmetov's financial support continues (D'Anieri, 2007, p. 170).

The 2004 presidential election and resulting Orange Revolution dealt a huge blow to the Party of Regions. Not only was Yanukovych forced to concede the election after the second round, but the Party of Regions, which had been expanding its base, received a massive dose of negative publicity after accusations of blatant electoral fraud were levelled at them.

Fortunately for the Party of Regions, the "Orange" parties – the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc, Our Ukraine, and the SPU – were plagued with constant infighting following Tymoshenko's election as Prime Minister and subsequent removal. By the time the 2006 parliamentary elections – the first held under the pure PR system – rolled around, the Party of Regions had regained their

footing and managed to come first with 32.14% of the vote, winning them 186 seats in the Verkhovna Rada. After a failed attempt at forming an "Orange" coalition, the "Anti-Crisis Coalition"(later known as the "Alliance of National Unity"), consisting mainly of the Party of Regions, KPU, and SPU, which had broken with the BYuT and Our Ukraine, was formed, and Yanukovych was once again able to assume the post of prime minister.

Yanukovych's triumph was fairly short-lived. The coalition had a narrow majority and was in direct opposition to President Yushchenko, who eventually dissolved parliament under the claim that deputies were behaving unconstitutionally, in violation of the Imperative Mandate, which prohibited individuals from switching sides. After a two-month standoff, new elections were eventually scheduled for September 2007. Although the Party of Regions came in first with 34.37% of the vote, it was not a part of the majority coalition that formed and remained in opposition until 2010.

Among the successor parties in Ukraine, the Party of Regions, although a centrist group and therefore not technically an ideological successor to the Communist Party, has seen the most success as time has progressed. Much of the voter base of the Party of Regions overlapped with that of the KPU, and as the KPU failed to adapt its positions to a changing voter environment, the Party of Regions was able to poach many of its supporters (Zimmer & Haran, 2008).

While ideologically different from the KPU, the Party of Regions is structurally similar, employing centralised command, and employs many similar tactics (as well as personnel), such as the use of *nomenklatura* and clientelism, to garner support. Because the Party of Regions grew out of the political interests of powerful economic actors in the Donbas, it tends to "lack a distinct ideology, instead representing the economic and power interests of [its] relevant members and leadership" (Zimmer & Haran, 2008, p. 553). However, in response to some of the more marketable interests of its voter base, the Party of Regions has added some ideological

components to itself. For example, in the 2006 and 2007 elections, the Party advocated closer ties with Russia (one of the most important electoral issues, as the outcome is economically relevant), as well as promoting Russian as a second state language or regional language, both policies which further endeared the party to its grassroots supporters in the southern and eastern regions, home to many ethnic Russians (Olszański, 2012). For example, 39% of people in Donetsk Oblast' identify themselves as "Russian", however, 93% use Russian as their primary language – and it is the most common language for informal conversation in Kiev itself (Kiev Center for Political and Conflict Studies).

Since 2010, the Party of Regions has fared extremely well. In February 2010, Viktor Yanukovych won the presidential election with 35.32% of the vote in the first round, and 48.95% in the second round, still drawing the majority of his support from the Eastern and Donbas areas of Ukraine. Shortly afterwards, the Verkhovna Rada passed a vote of no confidence and Tymoshenko was once again ousted from the prime ministerial post, to be replaced by Mykola Azarov, and the Stability and Reforms coalition comprised of the KPU, PR and Lytvyn Bloc. After the repeal of the Imperative Mandate in December 2010, the Party of Region's good fortunes continued – it was able to increase its seats from 175, obtained after the 2007 elections, to 180 as of December 2010, to 194 at the time of writing. Given the new electoral law banning pre-election blocs for standing for election as parties in the 2012 parliamentary elections, Yulia Tymoshenko's on-going imprisonment which renders her unable to campaign, and the Party's willingness to play dirty rather than cede power (C. W., 2012), it is likely that the Party of Regions will see its success continue during the upcoming election season.

Yulia Tymoshenko-Baktivshchyna Bloc (BYuT)

Like the Party of Regions, the BYuT is another electoral bloc that was put together for the 2002 parliamentary elections, around the iconic Yulia Tymoshenko. Tymoshenko began her political career as a member of the Hromada political party. However, after the initial Hromada faction

broke apart in 1998 following the flight of its most prominent member, Prime Minister Pavlo Lazarenko, to avoid embezzlement charges, Tymoshenko set up a new faction known as the All-Ukrainian Union "Batkivshchyna" ("Fatherland"), which soon developed into a party in 1999.

Tymoshenko's initial alliance with Viktor Yushchenko began when she served as Deputy Minister for fuel and energy in his cabinet. Kuchma dismissed her in 2001, and soon after, she joined the Ukraine without Kuchma protests in 2000-2001 and Arise Ukraine! protests in 2002-2003, founding a group called the National Salvation Committee (Kuzio, Prospects for the Political and Economic Development of Ukraine, 2007, p. 48) (Kuzio, The Orange Revolution at a Crossroads, 2006, p. 482). Kuchma viewed Tymoshenko's reformist tendencies as a threat and had her briefly imprisoned, which increased her visibility and further radicalised her rather than removing her from political life (Wilson, 2009, p. 315).

By the time the 2002 parliamentary elections rolled around, Tymoshenko had created the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc, consisting of Batkivshchyna, as well as two republican parties and a social-democrat party. BYuT ran for the first time as a populist, anti-Kuchma party, far more stridently so than NU, and managed to win 7.26% of the vote, which translated to 22 seats in the Verkhovna Rada (Katchanovski, 2008, p. 370). However, it was not until the Orange Revolution that BYuT really gained prominence.

For the BYuT, the Orange Revolution was a blessing – being in opposition was something that it (and Tymoshenko) was especially good at. Tymoshenko chose not to stand in the 2004 presidential elections, instead signing an agreement with Yushchenko called 'Force of the People', which, in the event of a victory would create a coalition between NU and BYuT in parliament, and Tymoshenko would be made prime minister (Wilson, 2009, p. 315). Although Yushchenko was the candidate, Tymoshenko was the face of the Orange Revolution right alongside him in the Maidan Kyiv's main square.

In contrast to Yushchenko's moderation and scarred face, Tymoshenko represent a glamorous side of political life in Ukraine, with her oft-copied braid and designer outfits. In fact Tymoshenko had remade herself into a populist heroine for the Orange Revolution, dying her hair blonde and adding the braid, evoking both the nineteenth century poet, Lesya Ukrainka, as well as sheaths of wheat, one of Ukraine's largest crops (Bloom & Shulman, 2011, p. 416). Despite being a native Russian speaker, Tymoshenko learned Ukrainian, the language of most of the regions where Orange parties had the most support, and spoke it exclusively in her addresses. However, Tymoshenko, never one to shy from confrontation, frequently became carried away during her speeches, urging radical actions like storming parliament, and Yushchenko had to work to keep peace within the ranks of the demonstrators (Wilson, 2009, p. 319).

Immediately following the outcome of the presidential election, tensions arose between Tymoshenko and Yushchenko. The Orange Revolution had massively increased Tymoshenko's visibility and popularity, although Yushchenko supporters alleged that on the day of his inauguration, Tymoshenko had packed the crowd with her own supporters, instructed to chant her name (Wilson, 2009, p. 319). Yushchenko attempted to back out of appointing her as prime minister, fearing her popularity, but eventually, in January 2005, Tymoshenko became the prime minister.

However, Tymoshenko's tenure was short-lived. As prime minister, she pursued an unpopular agenda of reprivatisations, supposedly to right wrongs done by Kuchma. At the same time, she ordered investigations into several of Yushchenko's cronies over gas deals. Meanwhile, Yushchenko's allies continued to undermine Tymoshenko, claiming that she wanted to take over a television station for the 2006 elections and accusing her of stealing millions in campaign funds (Wilson, 2009, p. 328). The end result of the infighting amongst the Orange parties was

that the entire Tymoshenko government was sacked in September 2005, a mere seven months after taking office.

With the 2006 parliamentary elections in sight, Tymoshenko and her allies began to work against Yushchenko, urging BYuT deputies to vote against Yekhanurov's premiership nomination (Katchanovski, 2008, p. 368). At the same time, Yushchenko was losing support due to his compromises with the PR and Yanukovych. In the 2006 elections, BYuT came in first among the Orange parties and second overall. It increased its vote share to 22.29%, receiving 129 seats in the Verkhovna Rada, a dramatic increase over the 22 seats that they had previously controlled. Meanwhile, NU and Yushchenko received just 81 seats, a far cry from the 112 that they had gotten in 2002.

Although the idea was for an Orange coalition to be formed, with Tymoshenko as prime minister once again, the Orange parties were unable to negotiate a compromise, with Yushchenko unwilling to accept Tymoshenko as prime minister. Eventually, with the creation of Yanukovych's Anti-Crisis coalition, BYuT returned to opposition, along with NU. During this time, Tymoshenko and BYuT continued to search for opportunities, making a deal with the Anti-Crisis coalition that diminished the powers of the president in January 2007, but negotiating an agreement with NU the next month to form an opposition to the Anti-Crisis Coalition (Katchanovski, 2008, p. 368).

In the 2007 snap elections, BYuT once again managed to increase its support, receiving 30.71% of the vote, 156 seats. The BYuT campaign promises in this election included reducing prices on meat and energy and raising wages and pensions – popular promises, to be sure, but also unrealistic (Katchanovski, 2008, p. 370). BYuT, somewhat unusually, also pursued a cross-regional campaign, attempting with some success to expand its support base beyond the western and central areas of Ukraine to the southern and eastern ones where the PR was

dominant (incidentally, the PR also tried a similar strategy) (Bugajski, 2008, p. 14) (Osipian & Osipian, 2006, p. 510).

After these elections, the Orange parties once again attempted to form a coalition, with Tymoshenko as prime minister. Although they were initially successful, the unstable coalition had just a two-seat majority, which quickly became an issue, as many NU deputies refused to vote with BYuT, and the coalition was forced to rely on opposition parties for support. By autumn 2008, things had deteriorated to the point that the coalition collapsed.

A new coalition was formed, consisting of BYuT and NU with the addition of the Lytvyn Bloc. The Tymoshenko cabinet survived a no-confidence vote in 2009, and Tymoshenko refocused her energy on the 2010 presidential election.

In the 2010 presidential elections, Yanukovych defeated Tymoshenko in the second round of voting 48.95% to 45.47%. This was a blow to the fortunes of BYuT and Tymoshenko, whose support suffered after economic decline during the Yushchenko presidency (Bloom & Shulman, 2011, p. 426). Tymoshenko appealed the election results, claiming fraud once again, however, no such large-scale fraud was discovered (Lukinova, Myagkov, & Ordeshook, 2011, p. 60). Immediately after this, the Tymoshenko government failed to survive a no-confidence vote, and the parliamentary coalition collapsed.

Since 2010, a number of BYuT deputies have left the faction, with most joining Azarov's Stability and Reforms coalition or the new Reforms for the Future faction. The number of BYuT deputies in the faction has declined to 99, after reaching a high of 156 immediately after the 2007 elections. Tymoshenko herself has been in prison since the summer of 2011 for abuse of power, as many felt that the agreement she negotiated with Russia during the 2009 gas crisis was not

to Ukraine's advantage, after a trial that many in the west allege was a politically-motivated show trial (G.C., 2012).

In order for BYuT to continue to be successful, it must overcome several hurdles. Its greatest weakness lies in the personality cult surrounding Tymoshenko – without her presence, it is difficult to imagine the existence of the BYuT. If Tymoshenko is to spend the next several years in prison, then the BYuT must figure out how to win elections under the immediate leadership of her deputies. If the BYuT is to continue to be an opposition party, as seems likely, then it must also refashion itself into an opposition with a vision, rather than opposition that simply opposes the propositions of the majority coalition. It must come up with programmes that are viable alternatives, and make it clear to voters what its platform consists of, as opposed to what it does not consist of.

After pre-election blocs were banned from the 2012 parliamentary elections in 2011, Batkivshchyna and several other smaller parties announced that they plan to run on a single party list during the 2012 elections (Interfax-Ukraine, 2012). It is likely that this alliance will constitute the main opposition to the PR during this election cycle, a position in which Tymoshenko herself is more than comfortable, once stating: "Those people who are used to being in power stand before the doors of the opposition like before the doors of the dentist; that is, without enthusiasm. One can only be in opposition of one holds certain beliefs." (Kuzio, Prospects for the Political and Economic Development of Ukraine, 2007, p. 29).

Our Ukraine-People's Self-Defence Bloc (NU, or NUNS)

Our Ukraine (NU) is another political party that was created specifically for the 2002 elections by Viktor Yushchenko, the former head of the National Bank, and prime minister from 1999-2001. Our Ukraine initially represented an alliance of right-wing parties who were in opposition to then-President Kuchma; however, the Yushchenko ultimately chose to remain cautiously

ambivalent on this score (D'Anieri, 2007, p. 116). Our Ukraine, which was the first time that the ring-wing parties had presented a united front, quickly became a credible challenge to Kuchma and his allies, coming in first in the 2002 elections with 23.57% of the proportional vote and 42 SMDs for a total of 112 seats in the Verkhovna Rada.

Although Our Ukraine performed well in its first election, it failed to unite the anti-Kuchma parties, which were bickering over parliamentary leadership decisions at the same time that Kuchma was attempting to lure them to his speaker candidate, in order to form a coalition (D'Anieri, 2007, p. 95). Instead, Our Ukraine was forced into opposition to a majority coalition dominated by For United Ukraine, with Volodymyr Lytvyn as speaker.

Despite Our Ukraine's opposition status, the 2002 parliamentary elections served as a springboard for its later successes. The initial elections enabled NU to build its voter base in the western, central, and northern areas of the country, where it won fourteen oblasts, as well as Kyiv, attracting voters disillusioned with the Communist Party, as well as attracting those who like Yushchenko's authoritative personality (Sushko, 2002). NU's success in the proportional districts (23.57% to ZYU's 11.77%) indicated that if Yushchenko were to embark in a one-on-one race with Kuchma or a selected successor, he would have a good chance of winning. The victory established Yushchenko as a prominent opposition leader, and blatant electoral fraud and the use of state resources to promote pro-Kuchma candidates served to further united opposition parties around Yushchenko.

NU played an instrumental role in the Orange Revolution, the popular uprising that occurred after the 2004 presidential election. In early 2004 Kuchma decided to abide by the two-term limit in the constitution and step down, and Yanukovych, then prime minister, was put forth to run as his successor against Yushchenko. Although other candidates included Moroz, the leader of the SPU, and Symonenko, the head of the CPU, the election was really between Yushchenko

and Yanukovych. By this time, NU had managed to extend its organisational reach further than any other reform-oriented party since independence (McFaul, 2010).

The campaign was hotly contested by both candidates, full of intrigue and drama, and certainly less than transparent. To start, Kuchma's state-controlled media bombarded viewers with coverage of the Yanukovych campaign, giving little airtime to Yushchenko. The Yanukovych campaign also stacked the list of candidates with fakes, some extreme right-wing nationalists designed to detract support from Yushchenko by campaigning for him, and some Yanukovych supporters to fill local election committees with like-minded people willing to overlook electoral fraud (Wilson, 2009, p. 317). Meanwhile, the Yushchenko campaign had been meeting with the Security Service of Ukraine in an attempt to convince them not to manipulate election results, and actually succeeding in persuading one faction to provide information on planned fraud activities. The drama culminated on 9 September 2004, when Yushchenko was rushed to the hospital in Vienna with what turned out to be dioxin poisoning, and his eventual return to the campaign trail was met with an outpouring of public support. (Wilson, 2009) (D'Anieri, 2007)

Yanukovych won the first round of elections narrowly, but as neither candidate had received 50%, it was necessary to hold a second round of run-off elections on 20 November 2004. As the run-off progress, reports of crude electoral fraud (including voter turnout in Donetsk, which mysteriously increased from 78% to 97% overnight) streamed in from around the country, from observers of all backgrounds (D'Anieri, 2007, p. 97). When the results were reported, the Central Election Commission said that Yanukovych had won with 49.5% of the vote, to Yushchenko's 46.6%. Immediately, protestors took to the streets in Kyiv and other cities, urged on by Yushchenko, Tymoshenko, and other opposition leaders. In early December, the Supreme Court declared the second round of elections invalid and called for a third round to be held on

December 26. Yushchenko won this round 51.2% to 44.2%, a result that closely mimicked exit poll predictions for the second round of voting (Wilson, 2009).

Although the Orange Revolution was highly publicised and succeeded in installing a president disconnected from the scandals of the Kuchma regime, it did not result in success across the board for Orange parties in future elections. While Yushchenko did ultimately win the presidential election, the vote was still split along relatively narrow margins, geographically, with the southern and eastern regions handily supporting Yanukovych. Indeed, in these areas, the Orange Revolution is viewed unfavourably, with many people believing it to be a coup d'état (Osipian & Osipian, 2006).

Almost immediately after his electoral victory, Yushchenko began to encounter problems. First, the Yushchenko-Tymoshenko alliance began to disintegrate amidst competition. Tymoshenko supporters alleged that Yushchenko tried to renege on their 'Force of the People' agreement from before the election, which would give Tymoshenko the position of prime minister (Wilson, 2009, p. 321). Eventually, the first Tymoshenko government was formed in January 2005, but the damage to the Orange relationship had been done.

Strategy missteps in 2005 and 2006 led to diminished power for NU. First, Yushchenko sacked Tymoshenko's government via television address in September 2005, replacing her with Yuriy Yekhanurov, a politician from his own party, very publicly dividing the Orange coalition. Yushchenko then signed an agreement with Yanukovych, which, among other things, proposed amnesty for election fraud in 2004, and Yushchenko never attempted to fulfil his campaign promise of 'bandits to prison' (Kuzio, Prospects for the Political and Economic Development of Ukraine, 2007, p. 33). Finally, many Ukrainians were displeased with Yushchenko's handling of gas negotiations with Russia in the winter of 2005-2006, which resulted in Russia briefly cutting

off supplies to Ukraine before negotiations resumed and a less-than-transparent gas agreement. (Kuzio, The Orange Revolution at a Crossroads, 2006)

After these early issues in the Yushchenko presidency, NU was unable to regain its footing. By the time the March 2006 parliamentary elections (the first to be held under a pure proportional system) rolled around in March, NU received 13.95% of the vote, nearly 10% less than it had in the 2002 elections. This put it in third, behind the Party of Regions and BYuT, with just 81 seats, compared to its previous 112. Many of the national-democratic parties that had been members of the NU bloc in the 2002 elections refused to join it again for the 2006 elections, instead creating their own blocs and sapping support from NU, but also making the bloc rather more centrist in orientation (Kuzio, The Orange Revolution at a Crossroads, 2006, p. 479).

NU struggled with its newly diminished power, particularly in light of BYuT's successes, as coalition negotiations commenced in 2006. The NU and Yushchenko desperately wanted to prevent Tymoshenko from returning to power despite a pre-election agreement that gave the winning Orange party the right to nominate the prime minister, which eliminated the possibility of any Orange coalition, leaving NU to negotiate with the PR (Kuzio, Prospects for the Political and Economic Development of Ukraine, 2007, p. 43). For a brief period of time in June, it seemed as though an Orange coalition might become a reality, but after the SPU left the coalition over issues with the selection of parliamentary speaker, the coalition collapsed before it could put forward a government.

The eventuality was that the Anti-Crisis Coalition/Alliance of National Unity was created, with the PR, the KPU, the SPU, and NU, with Yanukovych as the prime minister. Yushchenko was unable to negotiate the compromises that he sought (the exclusion of the KPU from the coalition, Yekhanurov or a less polarising figure than Yanukovych), further weakening his position and fostering dissent within the ranks of NU, with only 30 out of 81 NU deputies voting

for Yanukovych's premiership (Kuzio, The Orange Revolution at a Crossroads, 2006, p. 483) (Wilson, 2009, p. 333).

At this point, Yushchenko's options were to join the coalition or to dissolve the Verkhovna Rada and call for snap elections. As unpalatable as the first option was, the second was far worse. By this time, NU's approval ratings had declined to around 8%, indicating that NU would most likely suffer further losses if another round of elections were to be held (D'Anieri, 2007, p. 142). Thus, the coalition was formed with only BYuT in opposition.

The Anti-Crisis Coalition was obviously untenable, composed of such polarised parties as it was, and by October 2006, four of the six NU deputies who had become ministers had quit. Meanwhile, the PR had sought to undermine Yushchenko at every turn, against the spirit of the "Universal" agreement that they had signed to form the coalition (Wilson, 2009, p. 333). Finally, in April 2007, eleven deputies defected from Orange parties to the PR, in violation of the imperative mandate, with the PR bragging that they would soon reach a constitutional majority of 300 deputies (Wilson, 2009). For Yushchenko, this was the last straw. He dissolved parliament with questionable legality, citing the violation of the imperative mandate, and called for new elections to be held in September 2007 (Katchanovski, 2008, p. 360).

Once again, Yushchenko and NU (now NUNS) were dealt a devastating blow at the polls. NUNS received just 14.15% of the vote and 72 seats, far behind the 30.71% and 34.37% posted by BYuT and PR, respectively. The former Orange-allied SPU was eliminated from the Verkhovna Rada altogether, and Yushchenko was once again forced to consider either the BYuT or PR as a coalition partner. Ultimately, Yushchenko was forced to agree to a BYuT-NUNS coalition with Tymoshenko as prime minister, which once again proved to be unstable, particularly during the 2008 Russian-Georgian War. Yushchenko viewed Tymoshenko as his main rival for the Orange vote in the 2010 presidential election and once again, consistently took steps to undermine her

(Haran, 2010, p. 95). By the end of 2008, the initial coalition had broken down, and a new one, composed of BYuT, NUNS and the Lytvyn Bloc, had been formed (Wilson, 2009, p. 336).

Yushchenko did not make it out of the first round of voting in the 2010 presidential election, which ended up a run-off between Yanukovych and Tymoshenko. After Yanukovych's victory, Tymoshenko was once again ousted as prime minister, and BYuT/NUNS/Lytvyn coalition collapsed, replaced by the Stability and Reforms coalition. The Stability and Reforms coalition excluded NUNS, whose number of seats declined to 61 following the repeal of the imperative mandate in 2010.

It is likely that NUNS will continue in its losing trajectory in the 2012 parliamentary elections. With the ban on pre-election blocs, NUNS will be reduced to its individual parties, and it is unlikely to gain many seats in the Verkhovna Rada, if any at all.

Communist Party of Ukraine (KPU)

In the wake of the collapse of communism, the Communist Party of Ukraine was banned from 1991 until 1993. It returned in time for the 1994 parliamentary elections as a new, re-registered party under the leadership of Petro Symonenko, who is still the Chairman at present. The new KPU, which is not officially connected with the Communist Party present during the Soviet Union, is still connected significantly by ideology and history, as well as the practise of clientelism (Zimmer & Haran, 2008).

KPU ideology remained Marxist-Leninist, and staunchly pro-Russian/Belarusian, not only opposing the Ukrainian presidency but going as far as to call for the restoration of the Soviet Union at one point (Symonenko: Spectre of the Past, 1999). Although KPU policies have become slightly more centrist with time, it continues to support state ownership of land, macroeconomic planning, and monopolisation of foreign trade. Modernisation of KPU policies was delayed largely by the fact that until 2006, it was not really a part of a government. Thus, it

was never necessary for the party to dilute campaign promises as a member of a coalition, and it was not forced to moderate its ideology (Zimmer & Haran, 2008, p. 552).

The KPU enjoyed its heyday in the 1990s, when it achieved the largest number of deputies in both the 1994 and 1998 parliamentary elections (135 and 121, respectively). However, after Symonenko stood in the 1999 presidential election and came in second to Kuchma, the influence of the KPU began and has continued to wane. (Kuzio, Ukraine: Muddling Along, 2011) The majority of support for the KPU has been drawn from the eastern industrial region of Ukraine, the industrial base of Soviet Ukraine, as well as bureaucrats. (Zimmer & Haran, 2008, p. 547)

In more recent elections, many voters switched their allegiance to newer parties as they began to establish themselves, particularly the Party of Regions, which draws its support from the same regions as the KPU. KPU support dropped to 19.98% in the 2002 parliamentary election, its number of deputies was halved from the previous term, to just sixty-six, and it lost the distinction of having the largest group of deputies in the Verkhovna Rada.

Initially, the KPU, as the primary left-wing party in Ukraine, served as a sort of opposition party to Kuchma and his cronies, but after the end of Kuchma's presidency, KPU support dropped even more drastically, to 3.66% in 2006 and 5.39% in 2007 (when it was able to attract some support from disillusioned SPU members). Kuzio describes the KPU as "a political party of pensioners", a statement backed up by exit polls from the 2007 elections (Zimmer & Haran, 2008, p. 552), with little hope for its future under the present circumstances (2011, p. 342). The vast majority of KPU deputies have traditionally been elected from party lists, and with the return of the mixed election system, the KPU is not expected to fare well in the 2012 parliamentary elections.

Socialist Party of Ukraine (SPU)

The SPU is one of the oldest established political parties of independent Ukraine, created in 1991 while the KPU was banned. Since the reintroduction of the KPU in 1993, the SPU, under the leadership of Oleksandr Moroz, has competed with it for the left-wing votes.

Although the SPU has consistently been a minority party in the Verkhovna Rada, its fortunes have declined since the Orange Revolution, of which it was a member, and it did not meet the 3% threshold necessary to enter the Verkhovna Rada in the 2007 snap elections.

The SPU was initially a member of the anti-Kuchma protests of 2000-2001 and 2002-2003, along with BYuT, so its inclusion in the Orange Revolution was a natural progression. However, in the political crisis that followed, the SPU chose to abandon the Orange alliance and join the Anti-Crisis coalition. By the time the 2007 elections rolled around, although the SPU had managed to slightly increase its support in the eastern areas, overall, it lost a large number of votes, which went mostly to the BYuT (Hinich, Khmelko, Klochko, & Ordeshook, 2008, p. 86).

The future looks fairly bleak for the SPU, which is unlikely to re-enter the Verkhovna Rada after the 2012 elections. The damage done by their defection to the Anti-Crisis Coalition irreparably damaged their newly positive image earned during the Orange Revolution, and they have been unable to regain their footing in the intervening years (Kuzio, Prospects for the Political and Economic Development of Ukraine, 2007, p. 46).

The Coalition Environment

Given the general lack of ideological platforms by most of Ukraine's political parties, the most obvious factor influencing the formation of coalitions in the Verkhovna Rada – particularly during the years of the imperative mandate – is the regional nature of the parties present as

well as the relationships amongst their respective leaders. Political parties in Ukraine are frequently polarised over regional and personal issues, making it very difficult for them to find a middle ground from which to negotiate. There are usually large numbers of small (and frequently, transient) factions present in the Verkhovna Rada, all jockeying for power, further complicating coalition negotiations.

Regionalism and Language Politics and Ethnic Minorities

Voters in Ukraine consistently vote along regional lines, in both parliamentary and presidential elections, and these regional divisions also overlay, to an extent, the linguistic divisions of Ukraine. Surveys conducted after the Orange Revolution demonstrate that regional divisions are extremely deep, with distinct regional cultures in existence (Barrington & Faranda, 2009). Problematically, the main regional divide in Ukraine results in voters being nearly evenly divided.

Regional divisions in Ukraine long predate the current borders of the country. Ukraine can be divided into a number of different historical regions, for example, Halychyna, Volyn, and Polissia in the west. These regions were historically Polish and were only incorporated into the Ukrainian SSR during World War II. In contrast with the rest of the country, the western regions of Ukraine have a large portion of Greek Catholics, while the rest of the country is predominantly Orthodox (Harasymiw, 2002, p. 212). Meanwhile, eastern Ukraine is composed of five heavily industrialised oblasts, in the Donbas region, where the presence of Russia and the Russian language are most predominant. Central Ukraine consists of the oblasts surrounding Kyiv, and Zakarpattia and Chernivitsi, former Romanian territories, former Czechoslovak and Romanian territories, make up the southwestern region (Harasymiw, 2002, p. 213).

Ethnic minorities in Ukraine constitute approximately a quarter of the entire population, with Russians making up the largest segment, especially in the southern and eastern areas. Because

of the structure of the USSR, Russians had no reason to assimilate with the local Ukrainian population, and instead, Russian became the lingua franca in areas with large numbers of Russians (Kulyk, 2001, p. 204). The result of this is that minority issues, especially those related to the status of the Russian language and relations with Russia, are hot button issues.

Russian speakers and Ukrainian speakers differ greatly on political issues, and the combination of region, language, ethnicity, and to a lesser extent, religion, is the best indicator of how Ukrainians will vote (Barrington & Faranda, 2009, p. 252). Looking mass attitudes in Ukraine in terms of support for Russia, Crimea shows a massive amount of support, the east, eastcentral, south, and southwest show a large amount of support, the northcentral and westcentral areas are nearly neutral, and the far west has a negative view of Russia (see Appendix III for maps depicting Ukraine's various regions) (Barrington & Faranda, 2009, pp. 249-250).

When the regional divides in Ukraine are looked at in the context of the election results, it becomes obvious that the Party of Regions gets most of its support from areas that have a positive viewpoint of Russia (for example, 73.53% in Luhansk oblast' in 2007 as opposed to 4.19% in L'viv oblast'), while the BYuT attracts voters from areas with a negative view of Russia (50.38% in L'viv oblast', compared to 5.10% in Luhansk oblast').

Politicians are well aware of the regional divisions in Ukraine, and they leverage this to gain support (Hrytsenko, 2001, p. 233). For example, Tymoshenko, despite growing up a Russian speaker in heavily Russian Dnipropetrovsk, now speaks exclusively Ukrainian in addresses and public life, in keeping with her populist image and to appeal to her support base in western Ukraine. Meanwhile, Mykola Azarov, the current prime minister, is unable to speak Ukrainian. The Party of Regions especially has exploited linguistic divisions, with Yanukovych promising to make Russian a second state language during the 2004 presidential campaign, and more

importantly, proposing the 2012 bill to make Russian a second state language, or at the very least, a regional language in about half of the oblasts (Osipian & Osipian, 2006, p. 508).

The significance of regional and cultural divisions in Ukraine cannot be underestimated. In July 2012, Volodymyr Lytvyn, the parliamentary speaker and a member of the Lytvyn Bloc and the majority Stability and Reforms coalition, resigned over a language bill proposed by the Party of Regions, a fellow coalition member. Lytvyn felt that, although a dialogue was necessary on the topic of Russian language in Ukraine, the bill would have come at the expense of the Ukrainian language (Interfax-Ukraine, 2012). The language bill was such a divisive measure that it resulted in a physical fight breaking out in the Verkhovna Rada in May 2012, as well as clashes between riot police and protesters opposing the bill in Kyiv. Since the majority of political parties lack specific ideologies and positions on issues, with the exception of the Russian one, this can often escalate into the major dividing issue in negotiations (Zimmer & Haran, 2008, p. 553).

Parliamentary Factions

Central to the structure of the Verkhovna Rada coalition system are factions (*fraktsia* in Ukrainian), which are the way that members are grouped. In the 2006 election, factions corresponded directly to the political parties present in the Verkhovna Rada due to the pure PR system used in the election and the rules of the imperative mandate. However, this was not the case prior to this election, and has not been the case since the repeal of the imperative mandate in 2010.

Factions were created as a way to incorporate the independents and small parties present in the early years of Ukrainian independence to encourage party consolidation. Typically composed of at least two parties plus assorted independents, with the idea that there would be fewer factions

than political parties present, "thus facilitating coalition-building and efficiency" (D'Anieri, 2007, p. 177). In reality, however, this was rarely the case (barring the elections affected by the imperative mandate), and there tended to be more factions than parties, as deputies realigned themselves post-election.

There were a number of rules governing the formation of factions, but the basic idea was that factions must be composed of at least 14 members (the minimum number of seats that a party could have in parliament). Unfortunately, this has consistently led to a weak and fragmented parliament, where there exists a continuous process of faction formation and dissolution. (D'Anieri, 2007, p. 179)

Although factions were initially intended to assist in the formation of coalitions by incorporating smaller groups present into larger ones, in reality, they have proven to be more of a hindrance. The faction system present in the Verkhovna Rada serves to undermine the party system, because the electoral party of a deputy would not necessarily be the same as their parliamentary party, an especially dangerous issue given Ukraine's already weak party system. Rather than unify parliamentarians, the faction system has instead led to the fragmentation of the Verkhovna Rada, when any group of fourteen deputies could create a faction (D'Anieri, 2007, p. 179)

Furthermore, the faction system in Ukraine provides practical incentives for factions to split, rather than unify. A recognised faction has the right to staff paid for by public funds, which can be used to reward supporters with paid positions, but more importantly, each faction is guaranteed a seat on the presidium, the organisational council of the Verkhovna Rada, which handles committee assignments and sets the parliamentary agenda. The end result of this is that a large number of small factions could control a disproportionately large number of seats on the presidium and could block the votes of larger factions, which may control more seats in

parliament overall but would have a smaller number of seats on the presidium (D'Anieri, 2007, p. 181).

In addition to parliamentary rules providing incentives for parties to split factions, there are also incentives for individuals to form their own factions. For many high-ranking party members, who might not be the leader of their party but still control a number of deputies, it is more advantageous for them to split and to form their own faction, which they can then have total control over. Not only would they gain a seat on the presidium, but they would also have the opportunity to increase their own political importance during coalition negotiations. As D'Anieri states, "the benefits of splitting a faction did not need to be enormously high as long as the costs were nearly non-existent" (2007, p. 181).

As part of the negotiations during the Orange Revolution, a constitutional amendment known as the imperative mandate was passed. Because seats are distributed via party lists and proportional representation, the imperative mandate effectively meant that seats belonged to the party, not the individual deputy. Particularly in the cases of less-powerful deputies, the imperative mandate prohibited them from switching parties, because doing so would mean loss of their seat, and they would be unlikely to obtain a position on a new party list.

However, the effectiveness of the imperative mandate is debatable. Although deputies could switch parties, they could easily vote against their party and undermine party leadership without consequence due to the secret voting system. For example, after the establishment of the Anti-Crisis Coalition in 2006, many NU deputies objected to the nomination of Yanukovych for the premiership; Tymoshenko declared that she would be interested in recruiting those deputies to form an "inter-faction opposition coalition" (D'Anieri, 2007, p. 189).

Table 6 Verkhovna Rada factions by date

Faction	Seats on 30/09/07	Seats on 31/12/10	Seats on 31/12/11	Seats on 31/09/12	Seats on 31/08/12	Net gain/(loss)
Party of Regions	175	189	192	192	194	19
BYuT-Batkivshchyna	156	113	102	100	99	(57)
NUNS	72	71	65	65	62	(10)
KPU	27	25	25	25	25	(2)
People's Party	20	20	20	20	20	0
Reforms for the Future	--	--	20	19	19	19
No faction	0	41	26	29	30	30

Source: Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, http://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/site2/p_fractions

Immediately after the repeal of the imperative mandate following the 2010 presidential election, the Verkhovna Rada has seen its deputies return to the political tourism that had previously existed (see Table 3.1). A lack of disincentives for splitting factions, coupled with incentives for this behaviour has made splitting factions is a positive-sum game for both parties and party elites.

Other factors

Personal enmity plays a huge role in Ukrainian politics. Political parties are frequently structured around one individual who leads the party, and this results in personal disputes turning into political situations, for example, the 2006 political crisis, which stemmed largely from rivalries amongst Tymoshenko, Yushchenko, and Yanukovych.

After the 2006 elections, Yushchenko and NU considered three main options for parliamentary coalitions. The first option consisted of an Orange coalition, containing NU, BYuT, and the SPU, which would have totalled 243 deputies. However, this coalition would have resulted in Tymoshenko as prime minister since BYuT had won the most votes, and because of Yushchenko's personal animosity towards Tymoshenko, this was an incredibly unpalatable option for him, and therefore, the NU. NU was also determined to control the parliamentary

speaker role, which alienated the SPU, resulting in them leaving the Orange alliance altogether (Kuzio, The Orange Revolution at a Crossroads, 2006, p. 481).

The second option was to form the so-called "Grand" coalition, consisting of the PR along with NU and possibly the SPU, which would have totalled 267 or 300 deputies, enough for a constitutional majority in the latter case. The PR agreed that Yekhanurov could stay on as prime minister if the Grand Coalition became a reality, as they were also interested in eliminating Tymoshenko from the government. Like NU, the PR wanted to stop reprivatisations, which had been high on Tymoshenko's agenda during her premiership following the Orange Revolution. (Kuzio, The Orange Revolution at a Crossroads, 2006, p. 482)

However, the Grand Coalition was not the most advantageous one for the PR, which controlled the most seats in the Verkhovna Rada and preferred that Yanukovych, its leader, be the prime minister. After the defection of the SPU from the Orange alliance following Yushchenko's unwillingness to compromise, the PR was given the opportunity to create what became known as the Anti-Crisis Coalition (later, the Alliance of National Unity). With just the PR and the KPU, which disliked the pro-NATO/US NU more than the oligarchic PR and had supported Yanukovych in the 2004 elections, in a coalition, they would have had 202 deputies, short of a majority (Kuzio, The Orange Revolution at a Crossroads, 2006, p. 483). However, with the SPU, the coalition could now have 243 deputies. The Anti-Crisis Coalition consisted of the PR, with Yanukovych as prime minister, the KPU, and the SPU, which shared parliamentary leadership with the KPU. Eventually, Yushchenko and the NU were forced to sign on to the Anti-Crisis coalition, although they considered themselves to be in "constructive opposition" (Kuzio, The Orange Revolution at a Crossroads, 2006, p. 483). Ultimately, Yushchenko's and Yanukovych's mutual dislike of Tymoshenko trumped their dislike for each other and caused them to publicly ally themselves against her (US Embassy Kyiv, 2006).

Summary

Coalitions in the Ukrainian parliament since the 2002 parliamentary elections have proven to be extremely unstable. The instability can be traced to a number of roots, most particularly polarisation on regional and language issues, personal divisions amongst party leaders, and parliamentary rules governing factions and their behaviour.

Besides defections, coalitions are weakened by the ideologically divided nature of the Verkhovna Rada. Since 1998, no party or bloc has come close to winning a majority of seats, necessitating the use of coalitions. The issue is further complicated by the fact that the parties controlling the first and second largest numbers of seats are usually diametrically opposed to each other, forcing them to turn to smaller parties to achieve a majority coalition. The current Verkhovna Rada, which has changed radically since the 2007 parliamentary elections, has 194 deputies who are members of the Party of Regions faction, 99 who are members of the BYuT faction, and 62 who are members of the NU faction. The rest are all members of smaller factions whose loyalties are up for grabs and constitute an important factor in coalition negotiations (Ukraine, 2012). Most of these factions are unable to work together in the long term, leading to the fairly common collapse of coalitions.

Finally, it seems to be the case that parliamentary coalitions in Ukraine collapse when the leader of the dominant party in the coalition is perceived as having become too powerful. Rules regarding faction creation in the Verkhovna Rada contribute to party leaders' unwillingness to combine forces, even if they might share similar ideologies or goals. For most of the Ukrainian politicians, power has proven to be more important than having a substantive agenda, and while most were willing to make certain sacrifices to be a party of the majority in the short term, they did so reluctantly, and in the long term, they preferred to try to negotiate a better option.

Chapter 4: Data and Analysis

Chapter 2 provided a theoretical discussion of the lifespan of a coalition – its formation stage, maintenance stage, and termination stage. It was hypothesised that parties enter into coalitions with the goal of maximising their long-term political influence. The immediate goals of the party in question depend on the stage of the coalition in question – during the formation stage, parties seek to join the winning coalition; during the maintenance stage, parties seek to maximise their benefits within the coalition; and during the termination stage, parties again seek to maximise their benefits with respect to other actors so that they may stand a good chance of joining the next winning coalition. It was suggested that a party's size is a major factor influencing their initial chances of membership in a coalition; however, in the later stages of the coalition's life cycle, strategy becomes more influential in determining what share of the benefits an actor receives. Strategy is an important factor in an actor's political success. Although an actor may be influential or large, its success is not guaranteed. Rather, an actor's strategy is largely determines its ability to convert resources and redistributive benefits into actual influence. However, different actors prefer different strategies based on their needs for achievement. This chapter will provide a discussion of the empirical accuracy of the hypotheses from Chapter 2, closely following the methodology used by Bueno de Mesquita in his similar analysis (Strategy, Risk and Personality in Coaliton Politics, 1975).

Size

As mentioned above, the theory presented in Chapter 2 cited size as the greatest influence in a party's chances of becoming a member of a winning coalition. A party's membership in a winning coalition is a prerequisite for it obtaining any later benefits of the coalition; therefore, it is first necessary to determine which parties are most likely to join a winning coalition. Principally, this chapter is concerned with assessing the relationship between a party's size and

is success in joining a winning coalition, therefore allowing it to win redistributive benefits in the later stages.

Defining Size

The concept of size can mean a number of different things in the political context. For example, size can be used to describe a party's resource base, or its popularity, or its legislative representation. A party's popularity amongst the electorate does not necessarily translate to its possessing legislative influence. Conversely, a party's legislative influence does not necessarily indicate its grassroots popularity.

Party list seats in the Verkhovna Rada (half of all seats in 2002 and all seats in 2006 and 2007) are allocated proportionally amongst the parties that have received more than 4% (2002) or 3% (2006/2007) of the popular vote, with a minimum of 20 deputies. This means that parties that receive a larger portion of the popular vote are able to increase their representation in the Verkhovna Rada by a greater absolute amount. For example, in 2006, the Party of Regions received 32.14% of the popular vote, which translated to it controlling 41.33% of the seats in the Rada; by the same token, the KPU received 3.66% of the popular vote, but it was only able to increase its share of the seats to 4.67%.

The share of seats that a particular party receives is particularly important in determining which party controls the decision-making process. In the Verkhovna Rada, no party or faction has ever achieved an outright parliamentary majority of 226 seats, which would grant it a monopoly over decisions (a constitutional majority of 300 seats would grant such an actor even more power). However, a party's political influence does not just consist of the number of seats that it controls. A party may control a large number of seats, but at the same time be excluded from the winning coalition. Meanwhile, a much smaller party that is a member of the winning

coalition may be able to wield a greater degree of influence over the legislative process and reap more benefits.

Size can be assessed using three indicators: popular votes, seats in the parliament, and amount of representation in a government. However, each of these indicates a different aspect of size and can only be used within the appropriate domain. Voter popularity is indicative of a party's popularity with the electorate, as well as its overall organisational ability; legislative representation is useful as a measure of size during coalition formation; and finally, representation in the government (i.e. within the ruling coalition) is useful as a measure of size during coalition maintenance and termination.

Temporal Context

Politics in Ukraine has been afflicted with a large number of changes in legislative representation due to defection from faction to faction within the Verkhovna Rada in the years outside of the Imperative Mandate. It is therefore important that care is taken in choosing points for measurements of a party's size at a particular time. Although some detail is lost in this approach, it is necessary to choose several intervals where the fluctuation in size is great in order to avoid becoming bogged down considering small, unimportant shifts that are not indicative of larger trends.

In general, three points will be used in considering size for the purposes of this paper: the 2006 elections, which resulted in the Alliance of National Unity; the 2007 snap elections, which led to the formation of the Second Tymoshenko Government after the Alliance of National Unity collapsed; and finally, the period in 2010 after the repeal of the Imperative Mandate, which led to large-scale shifts in factions and the formation of the current Azarov government.

Defining Benefits

In Chapter 2, it was established by the redistributive condition that actors can receive two types of benefits from coalition membership: redistributive and non-redistributive benefits – however, only redistributive benefits are convertible to political influence and therefore, able to affect a party's performance in future situations.

A good measure of redistributive benefits is cabinet positions, which allow a party to distribute patronage. Some cabinet positions, such as the prime minister and vice prime ministers, as well as the parliamentary speaker (a non-cabinet position), enjoy a greater degree of visibility and access to resources than lesser ministerial positions. Party members in prominent positions can increase support for their party by advertising their achievements in the government. However, not all ministerial positions have access to the same types of benefits. Therefore, the valued positions could be considered redistributive; the others would not be.

Size during the coalition formation stage

The first hypothesis of Chapter two discussed the potential sizes of coalitions and led to the conclusion that the smallest actors had the greatest probability of being included in a winning coalition, medium-sized actors had an intermediate chance of being in a winning coalition, and the largest actors were least likely to be members of a winning coalition.

The literature on coalition formation indicates that ideology plays a small, but not insignificant role, in choosing coalition partners. Ukraine, however, possesses a weak party system where parties are not generally ideological in nature, and instead tend to represent specific interest groups. The most complicating factor in determining the effect of a party's size on its coalition membership is the levels of personal enmity amongst party leaders. Ukrainian political parties are frequently structured around one prominent individual, and seemingly petty disagreements between different party leaders often have national political implications. For example, the coalitions after the 2006 parliamentary elections were complicated primarily by rivalry

between Yulia Tymoshenko and Viktor Yushchenko/Petro Poroshenko (of Our Ukraine), and Yushchenko's refusal to accept a broad OU-Party of Regions coalition with Yanukovych as premier, as well as enmity between Yanukovych and Tymoshenko, although to a lesser extent as this coalition was barely even considered as a realistic option (this situation was discussed in detail in the previous chapter).

Due to the influence of personal relationships amongst Ukrainian party leaders, it is necessary to use supplementary information to determine whether a party was excluded from a coalition due to its size or factors such as ideology or personal differences. In order to obtain more detailed information as to the motives of political actors in Ukraine, a number of anonymous online surveys were conducted with Ukrainian political elites. Contact was made via email, and survey invitations were sent out; twenty responses were received. The survey links included in each email were coded so that survey responses were automatically tagged with the respondent's political party but contained no further identifying information.

In all of the situations under consideration, the Verkhovna Rada has been composed of one "large" party, three "medium" parties, and one "small" party, where a "medium" party is one which controls a number of seats within one standard deviation of the mean, a "large" party which controls a number of seats greater than one standard deviation above the mean, and a "small" party is one which controls a number of seats more than one standard deviation below the mean.

Unfortunately, given the disparate actions of Ukrainian political parties, it is difficult to reduce the number of political parties present in the Rada at a given time into a triad. Yet this does not preclude the use of the type of analysis from Chapter 2, where potential coalitions were discussed in terms of the resources controlled by the actors in the system. This can be done by reducing the actors in the system – in this case, the parties present in the Verkhovna Rada at a

given time – to a smaller number of protocoalitions, which are groups of actors who in sync without requiring any formal agreement to do so.

(a) The two main "Orange" parties, BYuT and NUNS, are a one protocoalition, despite the differing opinions of their leaders
(b) The Party of Regions alone comprises a single protocoalition
(c) The KPU and SPU (2006) or Bloc Lytvyn (2007) comprise a protocoalition due to their collective desirability for the Party of Regions
(d) Defectors from a winning coalition whose defection results in the termination of that coalition are a coalition
(e) Actors remaining in the terminated coalition from (d) after the defections have occurred are a coalition

When a coalition is formed, it replaces the individual entities that comprise it, therefore, only three of the protocoalitions mentioned above may exist at one time. A protocoalition's size is equivalent to the number of seats that it controls in the Verkhovna Rada. With this knowledge, we can now examine the coalitions formed in the Verkhovna Rada from 2006 through 2010 in the context of the theories about size, which were discussed in Chapter 2. Recall that we are interested in situations where two of the three protocoalitions A, B, and C could form a coalition where $A > B > C$ and $A < B + C$.

The first coalition under consideration is the Alliance of National Unity, formed in the wake of the 2006 elections. After the 2006 elections, Protocoalition (a) was BYuT/NUNS, which controlled a total of 210 seats. Protocoalition (b) the Party of Regions, controlled 186 seats, and Protocoalition (c) (KPU and SPU) controlled a total of 54 seats. The coalition formed in this situation was BC, controlling 240 seats.

The second coalition of interest is the Second Tymoshenko Government, which was formed after the 2007 snap elections. At this time, Protocoalition (a) controlled 228 seats. Protocoalition (b) controlled 175 seats, and Protocoalition (c) commanded 47 seats. Protocoalition (a) formed its own coalition, controlling a narrow majority of seats.

Finally, the third and current coalition with which we are concerned is the Azarov Government, which came together after the collapse of the Second Tymoshenko government after the 2010 presidential elections. As of December 31, 2010, Protocoalition (a) controlled 184 seats, Protocoalition (b) controlled 180 seats, and Protocoalition (c) controlled 45 seats. Once again, the coalition that formed was BC.

Although there are some issues with this analysis – namely, that BYuT and NUNS are considered one protocoalition despite their highly publicised issues with each other, as well as the fact that this protocoalition actually formed its own coalition in 2007 – it simplifies the Ukraine's political structure into one that can be analysed. The most obvious conclusion that can be drawn from the protocoalition-triad analysis is that Chertkoff's extension of Caplow's theory, which predicts that that BC is the most likely coalition to occur, followed by AC or no coalition with equal probability, is accurate in this case. The number of cases under consideration is somewhat small, but the evidence demonstrates that Chertkoff/Caplow are likely to be correct over a greater number of iterations. It also supports Gamson's and Riker's hypotheses regarding minimal winning coalitions being the most likely to form. Finally, this approach results in no support for the anti-competitive model, which would have resulted in a coalition of either Protocoalition (a) and Protocoalition (b), or possibly a subset of Protocoalition (a) along with Protocoalition (b), although in Ukraine's case, this is more likely due to the personal differences between the leaders of Protocoalition (a) and Protocoalition (b) than it is to their respective sizes.

Relationship between size and redistributive benefits

The second hypothesis of the coalition theory postulated in Chapter 2 is that size and the allocation of redistributive benefits are not related – in short, that redistributive benefits are not distributed according to the parity norm. Previously, it was mentioned that cabinet positions are a good example of redistributive benefits, as some of them allow for the distribution of

patronage and public acknowledgement of good works, while other, less visible positions afford little privilege.

The advantage of membership in a winning coalition is that said coalition controls the management of resources within the system. Within this system, several indicators of the relationship between payoffs and size can be defined. The first indicator is *cabinet positions*, which is the percentage of all cabinet ministers from each party in a coalition, as well as the parliamentary speaker, also a prominent and valued position. The second indicator is *important cabinet positions*. This variable represents the percentage of valuable cabinet positions controlled by each party in a coalition. In the case of Ukraine, valuable cabinet positions would be the prime minister and vice prime ministers, and parliamentary speaker, all of which are the most visible positions in the Ukrainian political system (aside from the president). Finally, there is the *importance ratio*, consisting of the percentage of important cabinet positions awarded to a party to the percentage of seats that said party contributed to the coalition, which measures the proportionality of the distribution of cabinet positions.

From these indicators, it is possible to test the effects of the redistributive benefits of coalition membership based on the 2006 Alliance of National Unity. The first two tests look at the correlation between the payoff and the success of each party in the coalition during the snap elections of 2007, based on partial correlation coefficients, where the control variables are the number of seats won by each party in 2006 and percentage of votes won by each party in 2006 respectively. By using these control variables, it is possible to reduce the role of each actor's initial resource base as a catalyst for success following coalition membership. This increases the likelihood that a correlation between redistributive benefits and future success is accurate.

The second two tests examine the change in a party's legislative representation and the change in the percentage of votes won between the 2006 elections and the 2007 snap elections, which are also a measure of the fluctuation of a party's influence due to the coalition experience.

Table 7 Payoffs and performance

Variables	2006 Seats	2006 Votes	Change in seats	Change in votes
Ministries	-0.76	-0.99	-0.34	-0.22
Important ministries	-0.44	-0.67	-0.33	-0.09
Importance ratio	0.06	-0.12	-0.76	-0.53

N = 5

The majority of these variables indicate that a presence of a political party in the cabinet results in a poor showing in the next elections. However, in the case of Ukraine in 2006, it is necessary to take into account the situation with the SPU. During the 2006 election cycle, the SPU was identified as a so-called "Orange" party, as its leaders had participated in the events of the Orange Revolution. Yet after the 2006 elections, the SPU, the smallest of the Orange parties to enter the Verkhovna Rada in that cycle, was unable to have its demands for entry into an Orange coalition met by BYuT and NUNS leaders. Specifically, the SPU was interested in having Oleksandr Moroz, its chairman, installed as the parliamentary speaker. When the SPU realised that their demand was unlikely to be met, they eventually entered into a coalition with the Party of Regions and KPU, which needed the SPU in order to achieve a majority and were therefore willing to allow Moroz to become the speaker. Unfortunately for the SPU, this move alienated a number of its Orange supporters, and in the 2007 snap elections, the SPU's vote-share declined by 2.83%, bringing its total to 2.86%. Since it did not meet the 3% threshold, the SPU did not receive any seats.

In Table 7, it is shown that there is a negative correlation between ministries and future performance. However, the case of the SPU accounts for much of this association, especially since with Moroz as speaker, it commanded 16.7% of the important cabinet positions (which

also include the parliamentary speaker). The drastic number of seats lost by the SPU exaggerates the negative effect of controlling ministries on a party's future successes; it is significant to note that the Party of Regions also lost some seats after the 2007 elections but managed to increase its vote-share, while the KPU gained both seats and votes. This indicates that people were largely dissatisfied with the government's action during the 2006 Ukrainian political crisis, as the ruling government at that time was a NUNS one.

Despite the losses suffered by the SPU, Table 7 suggests that size does in fact play a role in gaining redistributive benefits in Ukraine. Because the Party of Regions needed both the KPU and the SPU in its coalition in order for the government, it was willing to given in to some of their demands – for example, that Moroz should become parliamentary speaker. BYuT is not a potential coalition partner of the Party of Regions for obvious differences in goals and programmes, and the NUNS leadership was consistently divided over whether to pursue a coalition with BYuT or the Party of Regions until it was too late for the two parties to coalesce. The end result of this is that smaller parties are given a certain amount of leverage over larger parties – so long as the smaller party is kept satisfied, the larger party can continue to enjoy its support; however, if the smaller party feels that conditions are unfair, then it has the opportunity to prevent the coalition from ever forming.

Important cabinet portfolios in a Ukrainian government tend to be dominated by the largest party in the coalition, which offers up the position of parliamentary speaker to smaller potential partners as a reward for joining the coalition (e.g. Moroz as speaker during the Alliance of National Unity, Lytvyn as speaker during the Second Tymoshenko Government from 2008, as well as during the Azarov Government). However, it is difficult to conclude whether or not this is actually useful to the smaller party in the long term. In fact, as previously discussed, membership in the Alliance of National Unity actually damaged the SPU's fortunes at the polls. Predicting the effects of Lytvyn's term as speaker on his party's electoral fortunes is also a

complex task due to the changes in the Ukrainian election laws yet again for the upcoming election, particularly as the ban on pre-election blocs forces Lytvyn's People's Party to run independently (Ukrainska Pravda, 2011).

Because important cabinet portfolios are generally distributed across one or two parties, there is not a huge amount of variance in the values of the importance ratio. In fact, for the 2006 Alliance of National Unity, only the Party of Regions and the SPU controlled important cabinet positions, with importance ratios of 1.075 and 1.21, respectively. A value of 1.0 would indicate that the cabinet positions were distributed fairly according to a party's size contribution to the coalition. These values for the Party of Regions and the SPU indicate that important cabinet positions were not in fact distributed in a particularly disproportionate manner. The KPU, the smallest constituent member of the coalition, was not assigned any important ministries and received just two cabinet portfolios overall. This is a reflection of the fact that a coalition with the Party of Regions was its only option, as neither the BYuT or NUNS was willing to consider it as a potential partner.

It appears that membership in a coalition is negatively correlated with future election performance. But how is a party's size within a coalition related to future electoral performance? If the theory from Chapter 2 is correct, then a party's future shifts in political influence should not be connected to the percentage of seats that a party contributes to a coalition. The partial correlation between the percentage of seats contributed to the Alliance of National Unity and the number of seats won in the 2007 elections (controlling for the number of seats won in the 2006 elections) is -0.55. The partial correlation between the percentage of seats contributed to the Alliance of National Unity and the percentage of votes won in the 2007 elections (controlling for the percentage of votes won in the 2006 elections) is -0.77. The correlation between the change in the number of seats from 2006-2007 and the percentage of seats contributed to the Alliance of National Unity is -0.29, and the correlation between the

change in the percentage of votes from 2006-2007 and the percentage of seats contributed to the Alliance of National Unity is -0.08. These numbers indicate that while coalition membership will probably result in losses during the next election cycle, the percentage of seats that a party contributes to a coalition has little effect the magnitude of these losses.

Once again, it is necessary to look at these numbers in the Ukrainian political context. The SPU lost a large proportion of its votes in the 2007 elections, a reflection of public dissatisfaction with the SPU's defection from the Orange alliance. Meanwhile, the Party of Regions gained in its vote-share, but lost eleven seats. This was due to the fact that BYuT increased its vote-share from 22.29% to 30.71%, gaining twenty-seven seats. NUNS received slightly more votes in 2007 than it had in 2006, however, like the Party of Regions, its slight gains were not enough to offset BYuT's, and NUNS lost nine seats. While not a coalition member, NUNS was initially able to count of its several party members among the cabinet ministers; however, these resigned in November 2006. The only coalition member to gain in both votes and seats was the KPU, the smallest member of the Alliance of National Unity.

Summary of the effects of size

This section examined two relationships concerning size: the relationship between size and coalition formation, and the relationship between size and coalition benefits. Although the sample size of coalitions observed in Ukraine is relatively small, the evidence indicates that their formation is in keeping with Chertkoff's iterative theory of coalition formation. That is, minimal winning coalitions are most likely to form, followed by medium-sized coalitions. Yet unlike the theory predicts, the largest individual actor is not necessarily the least likely one to be in the coalition.

In the Ukrainian case, the second hypothesis concerning size and the allocation of benefits does not necessarily hold true. The largest member of a coalition typically controls the bulk of the "important" cabinet positions (i.e. the premiership, vice premierships), however, the final

important position – that of parliamentary speaker – is typically reserved as a bargaining chip used to lure smaller parties into the coalition, this increasing their importance ratio. The majority of important cabinet positions are allocated in a manner that is very nearly proportionate to the percentage of seats that each party contributes to the coalition.

Although the initial distribution of positions is related to the size of a party within a coalition, it does not follow that the magnitude of their gains and losses are related to their size within a coalition. Rather, the overall gains and losses that parties suffer at the polls seem to be more a reflection of the public's evaluation of the coalition as a whole, rather than an evaluation of the individual party within the coalition (except in the case of the SPU, which was faulted for joining the coalition in the first place).

Strategic Behaviour

As demonstrated in the previous section, size and political influence do not necessarily go hand in hand. Although a certain amount of resources are a necessary requirement for any sort of success, the base availability of resources does not necessarily guarantee increased success. For example, simply because a party does well in one election cycle and manages to gain representation in the parliament does not necessarily mean that the party will equal or improve upon its success in the next election cycle. Furthermore, such a party may be unable to convert its hypothetical influence into actual political influence. This section is interested in how strategic behaviour alters a party's political influence, especially where increases in success as a result of the mixed strategy are concerned, by looking at what Ukrainian political elites believed to be important in determining success, and what actually influenced the distribution of redistributive benefits.

Elite Views on Strategic Behaviour

Although the findings on size in the previous section are theoretically relevant, when determining what actually influences political life, it is necessary to determine whether Ukrainian political elites view size or strategy as more important factors. To do this, the same

survey previously referenced was use. It included questions such as "In your experience, did the bigger or smaller parties in the coalition gain more? Why?" "What has your party gained from joining coalitions? What has it lost?" and so on. Once again, several responses from the survey were supplemented with statements regarding size and strategy made by Ukrainian political elites and recorded in US diplomatic cables. These responses were then recoded into a single variable with two possible values: elites who valued size over strategy would have attributed gains to resources or power; elites who valued strategy over size would have attributed gains to organisation or effective leadership.

Table 8 Do coalition gains depend on size or strategy?

	PR	*BYuT*	*NUNS*	*KPU*	*BL*	*SPU*	**Total**
Strategy	3 (60%)	4 (66.7)	5 (83.3)	2 (100)	1 (50)	2 (66.7)	17 (70.8)
Size	2 (40)	2 (33.3)	1 (16.7)	0 (0.00)	1 (50.0)	1 (33.3)	6 (29.2)
Total	5 (100)	6 (100)	6 (100)	2 (100)	2 (100)	3 (100)	24 (100)

Chi square = 2.05714. Not significant.

The above table reports the distribution of answers along size and strategy lines. In general, most party elites believe that strategy is more important than size. These elites typically attributed their party's success to its strategic manoeuvres within a coalition, rather than its constituent size. Several factors may influence these responses. First, small parties may seek to minimise the impact of their size in comparison to that of larger actors and emphasise strategy, which is independent of size. By the same token, small parties whose strategies may have failed to lead to success may seek to blame their failures on their size.

By looking at party's responses broken down by size, it is possible to ascertain whether or not this has influenced the responses. As this question concerns a party's organisational capabilities, as well as its ability to convert redistributive benefits into influence, the results below are based on the 2006 parliamentary election results. Parties whose vote share was

above the mean are considered "large" and parties whose vote share was below the mean are considered "small".

Table 9 Perceptions concerning impact of strategy and size on benefits

	Party Size	
	Large	**Small**
Strategy	12 (70.6%)	5 (71.4)
Size	5 (29.4)	2 (28.6)

This table shows that there is no appreciable difference between leaders of large parties and leaders of smaller parties in terms of their perceptions of the impact of size and strategy on coalition benefits. Overall, elites from both large and small parties demonstrate some preference for strategy over size when determining successes within a coalition.

Although leaders believed that strategy over size was more important in determining the overall distribution of benefits, it does not necessarily follow that they applied this same perception to the successes of their own party. Once again, we turn to the survey results for further insight into leaders' thoughts as to their perceptions of the effect of the coalition on their organisational strength. The first question looks at the effect that coalition membership has on the size and organisational development of a party, while the second one looks at whether the party has achieved what it expected.

Table 10 Impact on organisational capability by size

Party Size	Great growth	Some growth	No change	Some loss	Great loss
Large	1 (7.69%)	5 (38.4)	3 (23.1)	3 (23.1)	1 (7.69)
Small	0 (0.00)	2 (28.6)	2 (28.6)	2 (28.6)	1 (14.2)

N=20, Chi square = 0.973312. Not significant.

Table 11 Did gains meet your initial expectations?

	Response			
Party Size	*No*	*Somewhat*	*Yes*	*Better*
Large	3 (23.1%)	5 (38.5)	4 (30.8)	1 (7.69)
Small	2 (28.6)	4 (57.1)	1 (14.3)	0 (0.00)

N=20, Chi square = 1.44078. Not significant.

In both Table 10 and

Table 11 above, the data fails to indicate that there is a relationship between party leaders' perceptions of their performance due to party size. The first table indicates that party leaders' opinions on the impact of coalition membership on their organisational capacity does not differ due to size, while the second table indicates that party leaders' perceptions of how well their expectations were met also do not differ based on party size. This is fairly consistent with

Table 9's indication that party leaders from large parties do not have radically different expectations of success than leaders from small parties. Having now established that party leaders across the board seem to perceive strategy as the most important factor in successful coalition membership, it is now possible to analyse the relationship between strategy and actual outcomes.

Defining Strategic Preferences

The third hypothesis of Chapter 2 refers to the influence that an actor's strategic preferences have on their success in getting benefits within the coalition. More specifically, it states that actors who prefer the mixed strategy are the most successful in acquiring redistributive benefits. In order to test this hypothesis, it is necessary to devise several indicators.

One option to analyse the behaviour of actors within coalitions would be to look at how events are reported by the media, such as *Holos Ukrainy*, the official Verkhovna Rada newsletter, the

Kyiv Post, and *Zerkalo Nedeli*. However, all media runs the risk of suffering from bias – for example, *Zerkalo Nedeli* has a notoriously liberal bias. At the same time, media attention tends to focus on examples of more extreme behaviour, such as the Verkhovna Rada's highly publicised brawls.

The more effective option is to measure the actors' predispositions for a certain strategy. Because this can be done through the use of survey questions, questions can be tailored to provoke a specific response that measures strategic preferences rather than simply observing behaviour. These questions can specifically look for answers that can be categorised as either "cooperative" or "competitive", keeping in line with the theory put forth in Chapter 2. Furthermore, by asking actors about their general behaviour, rather than their behaviour in terms of one specific event, it is possible to recognise broader patterns in leadership preferences. This is especially useful because these patterns can be used not only to analyse past and present behaviour, but to forecast future behaviour as well. Leaders of the main Ukrainian political parties under consideration have experienced fairly low turnover in the years that this study covers.

In Chapter 2, competitive behaviour was defined as seeking to satisfy the political goals of an individual actor (i.e. a leader or party), rather than the collective goals of the coalition. Competitive behaviour, on the other hand, was defined as behaviour seeking to satisfy the shared goals of a coalition. Mixed behaviour is a combination of competitive and cooperative behaviour.

Strategy and redistributive benefits

The responses were coded based on responses to several open-ended questions that asked whether respondents would choose collective benefits over individual ones, or vice versa. If a response indicated that a respondent was unwilling to sacrifice some benefits its party might

receive and preferred situations that would benefit it at the expense of fellow coalition members, it was deemed competitive. If a response indicated that a respondent would be willing to sacrifice some of its benefits in favour of the shared coalition aims, then it was deemed cooperative. Cooperative responses were assigned a score of -1.00, competitive responses were assigned a score of +1.00, and responses that were neither cooperative nor competitive were assigned a score of 0.00. Responses were included if respondents answered at least one of the questions used to code strategic predisposition with an explicitly cooperative or competitive response. As in previous sections of this study, several survey responses were supplemented with information obtained from US diplomatic cables in which Ukrainian political elites explicitly stated their political intentions or motivations in a particular situation.

It is assumed when computing these indicators that a party's strategic predisposition is represented by the average strategic predisposition of party leaders, as well as that decisions made by party leaders are correlated with their strategic predispositions.

The first indicator, called *average strategy* consists of first summing all of the responses for each party responded, then dividing by the number of responses. Then these numbers were added together and divided by the number of respondents by party. Thus the average strategy has a range from -1.00 to +1.00, where -1.00 would indicate that all responses from that party were cooperative, and +1.00 would indicate that all responses from that party were competitive.

The second indicator used in this analysis is the *mixed strategy* index, which measures the extent to which party leaders lean towards a mixed strategy. The mixed strategy index is computed as follows:

$$M = 1 - \left|\frac{competitive - cooperative}{competitive + cooperative}\right|,$$

where *cooperative* is the frequency of cooperative responses from the leaders of a party and *competitive* is the frequency of competitive responses. The mixed strategy index indicates the overall extent to which a party deviates from either a pure competitive or pure cooperative approach. The mixed strategy index ranges in value from 0.00 to 1.00, where 0.00 indicates that the party's responses were all either purely competitive or purely cooperative, and 1.00 indicates that the party's responses were equally competitive and cooperative.

Table 12 Average and mixed strategy scores by party

Party	Average strategy	Mixed strategy
PR	+0.34	0.64
BYuT	+0.46	0.55
NUNS	- 0.13	0.86
KPU	+0.10	0.91
SPU	+0.37	0.64
BL	+0.25	0.73

The mean average strategy score is +0.23 with a standard deviation of 0.19. The mean mixed strategy index is 0.72 with a standard deviation of 0.13.

It is now possible to examine the third hypothesis in light of the results computed in

Table 12. The first step in this analysis is to look at the first part of the hypothesis on its own. The first part of the third hypothesis stated that an actor's share of redistributive benefits would increase as that actor pursues an increasingly mixed strategy. This analysis will continue to apply the theory from Chapter 2 regarding the association between a fifty-fifty mixed strategy and maximising success, which also made the assumption that the extent to which a party could be either cooperative or competitive would be influenced by the tolerance limits of the other coalition members. Although these analyses make no attempt to assess the tolerance limits of the actors, they do assume that the idea strategy is a perfectly equal mix of competitive and cooperative.

The correlation between the mixed strategy and the importance ratio is r=-0.47 and r^2=0.22, using a combination of the importance ratios from both the 2006 Alliance of National Unity and the 2007 Second Tymoshenko government in order to get an overall view of the relationships, and the correlation between the average strategy and the importance ratio is r=0.079 and r^2=0.0063.

These correlations are extremely interesting in light of the sixth hypothesis, which states that an actor seeking to pursue the mixed strategy will be able to do so most effectively only when they have the organisational capabilities to successfully convert their benefits into future political influence (although the analyses in this section do not take into account the organisational constraints of the actors). The lack of correlation between the average strategy and the importance ratio is expected, because the average strategy represents competitiveness/cooperativeness. However, the moderate negative correlation between the mixed strategy, which represents the degree to which an actor applies both competitive and cooperative strategies, and the importance ratio implies that some actors may be able to exercise enough influence in the short term to receive a slightly disproportionate amount of redistributive benefits – yet they lack the organisational capability to convert these benefits to political influence in the long term.

Looking at the coalition formation environment of 2006 again, it is obvious that the SPU behaved in a competitive fashion. As previously discussed, the SPU was a member of the Orange alliance; however, as the BYuT wanted Tymoshenko as premier, NUNS wanted someone from their party as parliamentary speaker, the position that the SPU also coveted. Since the Party of Regions needed the SPU's seats in order to form a coalition (even with the seats of the KPU), and the KPU was not in a position to be making demands, the Party of Regions was willing to allow the SPU to name Moroz parliamentary speaker. In this instance, the SPU gained a

disproportionate share of the redistributive benefits. However, SPU's poor showing in the 2007 snap elections demonstrates that it was unable to convert the benefits that it received into political influence, and rather than gaining votes, it actually lost enough that it was unable to enter the Verkhovna Rada again. The SPU was unable to convince the electorate, who had previously elected a party that was a member of the Orange alliance, but were now voting for a party that had definitively split from that group, that their switch had been for the best.

Strategy and success at the polls

The results of Table 12 and the ensuing discussion indicate that the first part of the third hypothesis is not particularly supported by the evidence at hand. Particularly in the case of the mixed strategy, one would expect to see at least a slight positive correlation between the mixed strategy index and the importance ratio. The fact that a moderately negative correlation is present implies that either the importance ratio is a poor indicator of redistributive benefits, or strategic predispositions may not be as important as the theory initially suggests.

In order to progress, it is necessary to consider the second part of the third hypothesis, which states that there should be a positive association between the mixed strategy indicator and the share of an actor's redistributive benefits. Turning back to the issues at hand, if the importance ratio is a poor indicator of redistributive benefits, then the mixed strategy index should still be positively correlated with indicators of successful conversion of coalition benefits into political influence (for example, increased popularity at the polls during the next election cycle). On the other hand, if the strategic predispositions of actors are not as important as initially assumed, then it is expected that there would be a weak correlation between the mixed strategy index and the indicators of successful conversion of coalition benefits into political influence.

To test the second part of the third hypothesis, several indicators of electoral success will be used to reflect the changes in support for the Ukrainian political parties mentioned above. They are as follows:

(a) Verkhovna Rada seats won in 2007
(b) Percentage of votes won in 2007
(c) Change in number of seats from 2006-2007
(d) Change in number of votes from 2006-2007
(e) Per cent change in seats from 2006-2007
(f) Per cent change in votes from 2006-2007

Indicators (a) and (b) simply represent the amount of resources that each party had after the coalition in 2006. Indicators (c) and (d) represent the absolute change in the amount of resources that each party had, while (e) and (f) represent the proportionate growth or decline of the parties. The indicators which refer to change – (c), (d), (e), and (f) – give the best idea of the effect of a party's strategic predispositions on its real world influence.

Table 13 Strategy and performance

Performance	Average strategy	Mixed strategy	*N*
Seats won, 2007	0.32	-0.49	6
Votes won, 2007	0.40	-0.61	6
Change in seats, 2006-2007	0.14	-0.06	6
Change in votes, 2006-2007	0.38	-0.40	6
% change in seats, 2006-2007	0.39	-0.55	6
% change in votes, 2006-2007	0.58	-0.78	6

Table 13 contains the correlations between the indicators of electoral performance, and the average strategy and mixed strategy, respectively. This table indicates a complete lack of support for the third hypothesis regarding the use of the mixed strategy. While there is a moderate positive correlation between most indicators and the average strategy, there is a moderate to strong negative correlation for most indicators and the mixed strategy. Thus in general, Ukrainian actors who pursue a largely competitive strategy are more successful than their counterparts who pursue either a mixed or cooperative strategy.

Although the third hypothesis does not seem to hold true for the Ukrainian case, it does not necessarily mean that the effects of a party's strategic predispositions on its electoral successes should be discounted. Rather, Table 13 indicates that there are strong correlations between the mixed strategy and average strategy and the per cent change in seats and the per cent change in votes from 2006-2007.

Summary of strategic preferences

In short, the third hypothesis fails in the Ukrainian context. The third hypothesis is composed of two parts. The first part states that an actor will receive less redistributive benefits as it moves towards a purely competitive or purely cooperative strategy. The second part of the hypothesis says that an actor will receive a greater share of the redistributive benefits in the long term as it moves towards a mixed strategy. However, the Ukrainian data showed a moderate to strong negative correlation between application of the mixed strategy and successive electoral victories. At the same time, the moderate correlation between the average strategy and electoral performance indicates that pursuing a strategy that favours competitiveness over cooperativeness results in better electoral results.

At the same time, elite perceptions on the effects of size versus the effects of strategy on the distribution of redistributive benefits within a coalition seem to be unrelated to party size. The same holds true for the perceptions on the impact of coalition membership on a party's organisation capabilities, as well as how well gains met expectations. Thus, it seems that while the initial assumptions required for the third hypothesis hold true in the Ukrainian case, when it came time to apply the hypothesis to the data at hand, it failed to hold.

Risk, success, and the need for achievement

This final section will address the remaining three hypotheses (numbers four through six) from Chapter 2. Most specifically, this chapter is concerned with the reasons that the majority of

Ukrainian political leaders prefer strategies that tend to be more competitive rather than mixed or cooperative, as well as the relationship that the leaders' need for achievement has with their preference for a particular strategy. These hypotheses predict that individuals with a high need for achievement generally prefer the mixed strategy over the competitive or cooperative strategy, manage to obtain a disproportionately large share of the redistributive benefits from a coalition, and manage to convert these benefits into future electoral success, particularly in the case that they are able to implement their preferred strategies. These hypotheses will be examined based on the data collected via the surveys.

Determining need for achievement

In order to measure an actor's need for achievement, it is first necessary to establish a procedure to do so. The methodology followed in this section is drawn from Bueno de Mesquita, where he discusses a similar procedure (1975, pp. 129-133). As in the previous sections, Ukrainian political elites were asked a number of open-ended questions. The questions used in coding for need for achievement concerned both the respondent's individual political ambitions, as well as his/her ambitions for his/her party. After reviewing the responses of each respondent, the respondent is assigned a *need for achievement* score, by assigning a score of +1.00 for answers that indicate a high need for achievement and a score of -1.00 for answers indicating a low need for achievement. The individual need for achievement score is a sum of the individual scores of the answers, divided by the number of responses given by the respondent. These scores are then used to determine a need for achievement score for the political party as a whole by computing the mean of all of the achievement scores of the leaders of each party – the resulting score is the *need for achievement index*. The higher the need for achievement index, the greater the party's need for achievement. This procedure is in keeping with the earlier approaches to coding the survey data, for example, the strategic preferences.

Before continuing with a discussion of the data, a brief mention of potential sources of error in the data is necessary. When conducting a survey, there are many possible sourced that could introduce error. These include reliability problems, situational differences, and linguistic issues.

The survey questions were translated from English into Russian and Ukrainian, and participants were able to decide what language in which to respond. The majority chose Ukrainian, with two choosing to respond in Russian. Although my knowledge of Russian is strong, my knowledge of Ukrainian is weak, and I was forced to rely on the assistance of friends and dictionaries in order to interpret the responses.

Since the surveys were conducted online, I have no knowledge of the conditions in which the participants composed their responses. It is possible that different settings and times influenced participants' responses in some way. For example, some participants gave much more detailed responses than others. All of these issues have the potential to introduce random measurement error. Another source of error, bias, is unlikely as surveys were conducted blind.

Table 14 Need for achievement by party

Party	N-ach index
PR	3.25
BYuT	3.15
NUNS	-1.60
KPU	-2.25
SPU	3.33
BL	2.86

This table contains the need for achievement indices for each of the six parties that were in the Verkhovna Rada from 2006-2010. The mean score is 1.45 with a standard deviation of 2.40, with a median of 3.00. The "high" achievement group – parties scoring above the median – consists of the Party of Regions, BYuT, and the SPU. The "low" achievement group – parties scoring below the median – consists of the BL, KPU, and NUNS.

Strategic preferences and the need for achievement

The fourth hypothesis leads to the expectation that political elites with a high need for achievement will prefer the mixed strategy over the purely competitive strategy or purely cooperative strategy. This is due to the fact that individuals with a high need for achievement are willing to take bigger risks in order to achieve their goals than individuals with a low need for achievement. Because the risks associated with the mixed strategy are greater than those with the purely competitive or purely cooperative strategies, where the outcomes are much easier to predict, in theory, it tends to be the preferred strategy of actors with high need for achievement.

In order to examine the relationship between need for achievement and strategic preferences in an empirical fashion, it is necessary to look at the relationship between the need for achievement index and the mixed strategy index. If Bueno de Mesquita's fourth hypothesis holds true for the Ukrainian case, then the need for achievement index and the mixed strategy index should be weakly correlated. This is due to the fact that individuals with a high need for achievement are hypothesised to prefer the mixed strategy; however, individuals with a low need for achievement have widely varying strategic preferences that tend to be influenced by external factors not of concern to this study. The varied distribution of responses from actors with a low need for achievement means that the correlation between the need for achievement index and the mixed strategy index should be weakly positive.

Using the need for achievement index and the mixed strategy index, the correlation between the two is r=-0.92 (N=6). This indicates that there is a strong negative correlation between the need for achievement index and the mixed strategy index, implying that the fourth hypothesis is incorrect. Given the fact that the evidence in Ukraine did not support the third hypothesis, it is hardly surprising that the fourth hypothesis suffers a similar fate. The third hypothesis expected

that parties who applied the mixed strategy would receive a disproportionate share of the redistributive benefits. If this is false, then it stands to reason that parties with a high need for achievement would not prefer the mixed strategy, as its application would not yield the results that they desire. Rather, they would prefer to use the competitive strategy, which, as discussed above, tends to produce better results in Ukraine. This is supported by the data – the correlation between the average strategy index and the need for achievement index is r=0.86, indication that the two indices are strongly correlated.

Need for achievement and redistributive benefits

Although the need for achievement index is useful for drawing conclusions about an actor's strategic preference, it can also be used for a discussion of the successful application of the mixed strategy. According to the fifth hypothesis, it is expected that actors with a high need for achievement would be able to apply the mixed strategy optimally, while actors with a low need for achievement would not. In order to evaluate the need for achievement as it relates to the successful application of the mixed strategy, an examination electoral and coalition performance will be made.

As previously discussed in this chapter, the most useful indicators of a party's success in obtaining redistributive benefits are percentage of important cabinet positions controlled by the party, as well as the importance ratio. They will be used in the discussion of the distribution of redistributive benefits within the coalition.

Looking at the relationship between the need for achievement index and the importance ratios obtained from the Alliance of National Unity and second Tymoshenko Government, it appears that the two indicators have a weak positive correlation (r=0.23). Meanwhile, the correlation between the need for achievement index and the percentage of important ministries obtained by a party (computer over both coalitions as the importance ratios were for a broader depiction

of performance for all parties) is 0.37, indicating that the two indices have a moderate positive correlation. These relationships indicate that parties whose leaders had a high need for achievement were better at securing redistributive benefits, sometimes disproportionately so, in the form of important ministry positions.

While the need for achievement index has proven to be useful in determining success within a coalition, it is now necessary to establish whether or not leaders with a high need for achievement are able to convert their successes in electoral gains, as well as the effects that need for achievement have on initial election results before the coalition cycle begins. In order to do so, several variables will be considered:

(a) Verkhovna Rada seats (2006)
(b) Verkhovna Rada seats (2007)
(c) Percentage of votes (2006)
(d) Percentage of votes (2007)
(e) Per cent change in seats from 2006-2007
(f) Per cent change in votes from 2006-2007

Variables (a) and (c) measure the success of a party before the coalition cycle has occurred, while the remaining variables (d-f) are indicative of the relationship between need for achievement and application of redistributive benefits.

Table 15 Need for achievement and electoral success

Variable	n-ach	Mean	N
Verkhovna Rada seats (2006)	High	116	3
	Low	34	3
Verkhovna Rada seats (2007)	High	110	3
	Low	40	3
Percentage of votes (2006)	High	20.04	3
	Low	6.68	3
Percentage of votes (2007)	High	22.65	3
	Low	7.17	3
% change in seats	High	-85	3
	Low	+38.9	3
% change in votes	High	-1.66	3
	Low	+27.4	3

Table 15 indicates some unexpected results. The parties with a high need for achievement outperformed the parties with a low need for achievement during both election cycles. Yet it seems that once again, the parties with a high need for achievement were unable to convert their redistributive benefits from coalition membership into electoral success. However, the small sample size means that the effects from losses suffered by the SPU, which lost 100% of its seats in the 2007 elections, have a disproportionately large effect on the numbers computed above, as do the successes of the Bloc Lytvyn, which went from zero seats in 2006 to twenty seats in 2007 while increasing its vote share by 38.4%, from 2.44% to 3.96%. Discounting the effects of these two parties, the trend would be that parties with a high need for achievement managed to increase their success at the polls, as well as the number of seats that they held, while parties with a low need for achievement did not fare as well, regardless of membership in the Alliance of National Unity.

Political success as a result of organisation, motivation and strategy

The first part of this chapter provided a discussion of the influence of size on coalition behaviour, while the second part discussed the strategic predispositions of party leaders. Finally, the analysis of the data and theory will be completed by first looking at the combination of high need for achievement and predisposition to pursue the mixed strategy, and second, the effects of a party's organisational capabilities on its electoral successes.

Bueno de Mesquita's sixth and final hypothesis brings together the ideas of the previous five, with the statement that the actors most likely to increase their political influence in the long run are those who apply the mixed strategy, have the organisational ability to do so efficiently, and are willing to take the necessary risks associated with the mixed strategy. This hypothesis will be tested via a multiple regression analysis based on the absolute change and the per cent change in the percentage of votes won by each party from the 2006 elections to the 2007 elections. These two variables are chosen because they are representative of the changes in size

of a party's base of support and future potential. The number of seats held by a party is useful, but since it is subject to the minimum threshold, it can lead to an exaggerated effect on the data.

If the multiple regression analysis finds a positive correlation, this would suggest that the need for achievement and other indicators of willingness to take risks are useful for explaining political behaviour and trends in Ukraine. Furthermore, it would indicate that much of the performance of a political party can in fact be influenced by factors that are under the control of the party, rather than simply being subject to fickle public opinion. It also suggests that party leaders can be chosen on the basis of their predisposition for a particular strategy, and this can have a direct effect on the party's future successes.

The first set of data to be analysed explores the relationship between the per cent change in seats won in 2006 and 2007 as a function of the mixed strategy index and the need for achievement. In this case, the coefficient of determination is 0.70. However, the regression coefficient for the mixed strategy index is -17.6, while the regression coefficient for the need for achievement is 10.37 and the intercept is 10.44. These results indicate that approximately 70% of the variance in election results from 2006 to 2007 is as a consequence of the combination of mixed strategy and need for achievement. Furthermore, they show that a party applying the mixed strategy could expect to lose a rather significant number of seats, while a high need for achievement remains positively correlated with electoral success.

The second set of data looks at the relationship between the absolute change in seats from 2006 to 2007 as a function of the mixed strategy index and the need for achievement. Here, the coefficient of determination is 0.44, the regression coefficient for the mixed strategy index is -44.9, the regression coefficient for the need for achievement is -1.97, and the intercept is 37.2. In this case, 44% of the variance in the absolute change in seats from 2006 to 2007 is accounted for by the mixed strategy index and the need for achievement. Once again, the large negative

coefficient from the mixed strategy index indicates that parties applying this strategy are likely to lose seats. In this case, there is also a negative regression coefficient for the need for achievement index, which implies that parties with a high need for achievement may actually lose seats as a result of their achievement preferences.

Even without a discussion of a party's organisational abilities, it is obvious that the need for achievement and tendency to pursue a mixed strategy do in fact account for much of the variance in changes to votes received. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that taking into account indicators of organisational abilities will further increase the accuracy of these explanations. A good indication of a party's organisational ability is the size of its membership base. However, due to reliability issues in the reporting of party membership size in Ukraine, one indicator that will be used here is the percentage of votes won by each party in the 2006 elections. This is not the best indicator due to its linkage with the dependent variables used in the previous analyses; however, it is a good indicator of a party's organisational ability, as electoral success is largely dependent on a party's ability to get their constituents to the polls.

The second indicator that will be used in this analysis is the importance ratio. While the percentage of votes received in the 2006 elections is a reflection of the party's ability to mobilise its support base during the election season, the importance ratio indicates the party's abilities within the coalition. Parties with greater organisational abilities are more likely to make credible demands and have these demands met, for example, through the receipt of important government positions.

It is possible for the effects of organisational abilities on how well a political party converts redistributive benefits to future political influence to appear in two way: either they may affect election results separately from the redistributive benefits, or they may compound the effects of the need for achievement and mixed strategy index.

To measure whether or not organisational capabilities are a separate factor from the need for achievement and pursuit of mixed strategy, regression equations are used that take into account the effects of all of the variables in combination. Using such an equation, the coefficient of determination r^2=0.81, with the mixed strategy indicator and need for achievement having a positive effect, and the number of seats won in 2006 and importance ratio having negative effects. Running the same set of equations without the presence of the organisational capability factor produces fairly similar coefficients and a coefficient of determination r^2=0.80, so the effects of organisational capability are not especially great.

Since 80 per cent of the variance is explained by the regression equation, it is time to apply it to a real world situation – the 2007 snap elections in Ukraine.

Table 16 Actual and estimated changes in vote share

Party	Predicted change (%)	Actual change (%)	Error
PR	-40.6	6.94	47.54
BYuT	57.9	37.78	20.12
NUNS	-14.3	1.43	15.73
KPU	-24.1	42.3	66.4
SPU	-47.7	-49.7	2.00
BL	39.1	38.4	0.70

The error in predicting the results of the 2007 elections using the regression equation discussed above is quite large. In fact, the only two parties whose results the equation seems to have accurately predicted are those of the SPU and Bloc Lytvyn, one of whom suffered catastrophic losses at the polls, and one of whom entered the Verkhovna Rada for the first time after the 2007 elections. Experimenting with other variables for organisation capability, such as the number of seats controlled by a particular party after the 2006 elections in lieu of the percentage of votes received in 2006, does not improve the accuracy of the formula. Interestingly, the formula does seem to more accurately predict the per cent change in seats following the 2007 elections when the votes received in 2006 are included as a factor.

Table 17 Predicted change in votes and actual change in seats

Party	Predicted change in votes (%)	Actual change in seats (%)	Error
PR	-40.6	-5.91	34.69
BYuT	57.9	20.9	37.0
NUNS	-14.3	-11.9	2.40
KPU	-24.1	28.6	52.7
SPU	-47.7	-100	52.3
BL	39.1	100	60.9

While the absolute values for the differences in the actual and predicted changes still remain quite large, with the exception of the case of the KPU, the regression equation accurately predicts the direction of the change, although not necessarily its magnitude, while Table 16 correctly predicts neither the direction nor the magnitude of the change in vote share in most cases.

Summary of the effects of need for achievement

The final section of this chapter tested the three remaining hypotheses from Chapter 2. The fourth hypothesis predicts that actors with a high need for achievement will prefer the mixed strategy. However, the data collected via surveys indicated that there was a strong negative correlation between a high need for achievement and pursuit of the mixed strategy. This is due to the fact that Ukrainian actors expressed a preference for largely competitive behaviour over the mixed strategy. The limited number of actors who did not consistently behave in a competitive fashion also had lower need for achievement values, and it is these actors who proved unable to maximise their share of the redistributive benefits and increase their political

influence in a meaningful way. In fact, in the case of NUNS, the coalition situations of 2006 and 2007 seem to have had a distinct negative effect on its fortunes.

The fifth hypothesis relates to an actor's ability to successfully apply the mixed strategy. It postulates that actors with a high need for achievement be the most capable of applying the mixed strategy successfully; conversely, actors with a low need for achievement will not be able to apply the mixed strategy successfully. By analysing a number of electoral indicators, sorting actors by need for achievement level, it was possible to see that, although actors with a high need for achievement tend to initially outperform actors with a low need for achievement, their initial success does not generally translate into increased success at the polls. This is especially true in the case of the SPU, which managed to receive a disproportionately large share of redistributive benefits during the Alliance of National Unity, and promptly lost all of its Rada seats following the 2007 elections.

The last hypothesis that this study addresses unifies the ideas of the previous five hypotheses, by looking at the effects of an actor's organisational capability in addition to other factors. This hypothesis predicts that an actor will most likely be able to maximise its long-term political influence when it has the organisational proficiency to effectively apply the mixed strategy while also being willing to take the risks necessary to successfully apply the mixed strategy (i.e. have a high need for achievement). Because actors with these traits are most likely to maximise their share of redistributive benefits from a coalition, they are the most likely ones to maximise their long-term political influence. After performing a regression analysis of the data at hand, it was demonstrated that organisational abilities have a minimal effect on future performance. Meanwhile, the multivariate regression calculated for the per cent change in seats from 2006 to 2007 indicates that the relationship between mixed strategy and need for achievement does have a distinct effect on the absolute change in seats that a party controls, with need for achievement having a positive effect and preference for the mixed strategy having a negative

effect on electoral outcomes. An attempt to unify all of these factors into a predictive model failed, partially due to the small number of data points, which exaggerates the effects of outliers, such as the SPU (which lost 100% of its seats in 2007) and the BL (which increased its number of seats by 100% in 2007). Thus, the sixth hypothesis is a poor indicator of future electoral performance in Ukraine.

Chapter 5: Conclusions

The principal concern of this study is to test Bueno de Mesquita's theory of coalition behaviour, as defined in his 1975 work, *Strategy, Risk, and Personality in Coalition Politics: The Case of India*, in the Ukrainian context. This theory addresses the effects of strategic predispositions and need for achievement in impelling future political successes due to their relationship with obtaining a share of redistributive benefits. This final chapter will investigate the implications that the theory suggests about party politics in Ukraine.

Conclusions about coalition politics

Before discussing the specific situation as regards coalition politics in Ukraine, a summary of the theory discussed throughout this paper is necessary. First, actors join coalitions as a way to maximise their share of the benefits that may be received as a consequence of membership in the coalition. Under the redistributive condition, resources in a political system may be reallocated as a course of the coalition. Due to the fact that coalition partners are aware of the finite nature of resources, as well as their desire to maximise their long-term political influence, they often compete with each other in pursuit a disproportionately large share of the redistributive benefits available to coalition members.

Consequently, the level of competitive behaviour that can be observed within a coalition is restricted by the tolerance limits of the coalition partners, where the tolerance limits are a measure of the number of competitive demands that coalition partners are willing to accept before they begin to refuse them. In situations where the majority of partners have low tolerance levels, the best strategy for maximising coalition gains is to pursue an equal mixture of competitive and cooperative strategies. This enables actors to secure a greater long-term increase in benefits than pursuit of a purely competitive or purely cooperative strategy.

These initial theories lead to the six hypotheses that were explored in depth in this paper. Strategic preference is independent of party size – large and small parties are equally likely to prefer competitive, cooperative, or mixed strategies. Due to this, it was demonstrated that size does not influence the distribution of redistributive benefits within the coalition.

While size does not have a bearing on the allocation of redistributive benefits, an actor's need for achievement is related to the amount of redistributive benefits that an actor receives. Thus, if an actor has a high need for achievement, it is most likely to pursue the mixed strategy, which has the potential to yield the most long-term benefits. However, using the mixed strategy does not necessarily yield positive results; rather, an actor needs to have the necessary organisational capabilities in order to convert benefits received into real political influence. This leads to the conclusion that political parties have the best chance of maximising their long-term influence when they have leaders with a high need for achievement who prefer to follow the mixed strategy and have the organisational abilities to convert their coalition gains into future influence and success.

However, not all of the hypotheses were supported by the evidence from the surveys conducted with Ukrainian political elites, as well as the data collected electoral results, coalition composition, etc. The first hypothesis concerning the formation of minimal winning coalitions was proved to be true, although the sample size at hand was rather limited. However, the second hypothesis, which relates actor size and the distribution of coalition benefits, does not necessarily hold true for the Ukrainian data. Rather, the data demonstrates that, while actors may secure a disproportionately large or small amount of redistributive benefits in the form of important government positions, the amount of the disproportion never deviates particularly far from 1, which would indicate that important positions were distributed exactly according to the actor's size within the coalition.

The third hypothesis states that an actor's share of the redistributive benefits will increase as the degree to which it pursues the mixed strategy increases. However, in the Ukrainian case, it was demonstrated that future electoral success and pursuit of the mixed strategy were actually negatively correlated. Instead, actors who had a more positive average strategy, indicative of a preference for the competitive strategy, tended to have greater future electoral successes. The vast majority of the Ukrainian actors expressed some preference for the competitive strategy; therefore, actors pursuing the mixed strategy are more cooperative in comparison. This makes it easier for the competitive actors to achieve their individual goals at the expense of the more cooperative actors.

The fourth hypothesis relates an actor's need for achievement with the degree to which it prefers the mixed strategy. This hypothesis is also not supported by the evidence for the Ukrainian context. The reasoning is similar to that of the third hypothesis. In Ukraine, the competitive strategy tends to yield better results for actors seeking to increase their long-term political influence. Therefore, it is the natural conclusion that Ukrainian actors with a high need for achievement, looking to increase their long-term influence, should prefer the competitive strategy, which has the best likelihood of allowing them to achieve their goals.

The evidence against the fifth hypothesis is not as strong as the evidence against the previous two; however, it is not strongly supported by the data. This hypothesis relates an actor's need for achievement with its ability to successfully apply the mixed strategy, postulating that actors with a high need for achievement will be more adept at this. The data for Ukraine shows that, while actors with a high need for achievement are initially more successful than their fellows who have a lower need for achievement, these successes are not necessarily sustainable. However, the SPU was included in this sample as a party with a high need for achievement, and it suffered catastrophic losses in 2007, which offset the gains of the Party of Regions and BYuT.

Therefore, while the evidence does not support the fifth hypothesis, it does not entirely refute it, either.

Finally, the sixth hypothesis is also not supported by the evidence. This hypothesis predicts that actors who have a high need for achievement, the organisational capability to successfully apply the mixed strategy, and are willing to take the risks necessary in order to pursue the mixed strategy will accrue the greatest amount of long-term political influence within the coalition environment. However, this hypothesis assumes that there is a positive correlation between the mixed strategy and future electoral success. This was demonstrated to be untrue for the Ukrainian case; therefore it is not surprising that the sixth hypothesis does not hold for Ukraine.

Implications for Ukraine

The discussion of the data in this paper largely tends to observe trends rather than specific cases, although some discussion of exceptions to the rule is present in order to explain results in the context of the relatively small sample size. For example, it is demonstrated that there is a positive relationship between a high need for achievement and electoral success. However, the SPU had a high need for achievement but failed to re-enter the Verkhovna Rada after the 2007 elections, despite its membership in a winning coalition and control of the parliamentary speaker position.

This study has ignored many variables that would be specific to the Ukrainian case, particularly those related to regionalism, language politics, and ethnic minorities, all of which play a very prominent role in present-day Ukrainian politics. However, ignoring these very specific variables is necessary in order to test what is a very general theory. Yet even while failing to consider a number of these other issues in Ukrainian politics, it is possible to see that at least a portion of the theory can be applied to Ukraine.

The theory also fails to account for why some parties are better at recruiting leaders with the preferences and orientations that result in successful election results. Once again, it is likely that a number of societal factors are at play here. The formation of an individual's risk-taking and strategic preferences is often a result of the individual's background and early life.

However, despite these shortcomings and the failure for the theory to accurately predict trends in Ukrainian politics, this study does shed light a number of facets of Ukrainian politics. First and foremost, the study indicates the ability of party elite to affect the fortunes of their parties. Recruiting leaders with the strategic predispositions and risk-taking orientations that produce successful results can increase a party's long-term political influence. If party leadership is careful to recruit members who exhibit these facilities, then they increase the likelihood of their party increasing its political influence in the future. However, if parties do not attempt to evolve their leadership and instead choose to promote solely from within their party based on factors such as loyalty, this party would not be expected to increase its long-term influence.

Predictions for Ukraine's political future

Although the theory discussed in this paper has not been helpful in predicting election results, it does not mean that is impossible to do by looking at other patters in Ukrainian politics. This last year has seen a number of changes in Ukraine's political landscape leading up to the 2012 parliamentary elections. Most importantly, two changes have been made to electoral laws that are likely to have a great impact on the outcome of the elections. First, pre-election blocs were banned from standing election together. This will likely impact the showing of the opposition parties, including BYuT, which will now be forced to run as Batkivshchyna, and NUNS. For these elections, Batkivshchyna will be putting forth one party list containing its members, as well as those from the Reforms and Order Party and the People's Movement for Ukraine, both former BYuT members, as well as the Front for Change (Interfax Ukraina, 2012).

The second electoral law that will affect these elections creates a return to the mixed SMD-proportional system, with the seats distributed 50-50 along the same lines as before. At the same time, the threshold for share of votes required for entry into the Rada has been raised to 5%, making it more difficult for smaller parties and those which may formerly have run as a member of a pre-election bloc to enter gain seats. This electoral law is likely to assist the Party of Regions, which in 2002, won approximately 2/3 of its seats in SMDs. However, it will not do much to aid several parties who have historically drawn their support from party lists, such as the SPU and KPU, which have already seen their support drastically diminish during the last decade.

At the same time, the introduction of the political party United Democratic Alliance for Reform (UDAR), led by the boxer Vitaly Klychko, poses a threat for the opposition parties, who like to run on similar, anti-corruption, anti-Party of Regions platforms. This party is likely to receive support from disillusioned BYuT and NUNS members, and particularly threatens NUNS, which has seen its popularity slip since the Orange Revolution.

Political preferences in Ukraine seem to wax and wane with each election cycle, as parties continuously move in and out of power. Based on this assessment, it seems highly possible that the 2012 elections will produce successes by pro-European parties that current consider themselves in opposition to the Party of Regions. If this outcome occurs, then a coalition of current opposition parties (with the inclusion of UDAR) is highly possible, particularly as Tymoshenko's current imprisonment removes a potentially divisive character from the mix of possible ministers.

Appendix I: Ukraine Election Results, 1998-2007

Table 18 Results of the 1998 Parliamentary Elections

Party	% PR vote	PR seats	SMD seats	Totals
Communist Party of Ukraine	24.65	84	37	121
People's Movement of Ukraine (Rukh)	9.4	32	14	46
Socialist Party of Ukraine/Peasants' Party of Ukraine Bloc	8.5	29	5	34
Party of Greens of Ukraine	5.43	19	0	119
People's Democratic Party of Ukraine	5.01	17	11	28
All-Ukrainian Association "Hromada"	4.67	16	8	24
Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine	4.04	14	2	16
United Social Democratic Party of Ukraine	4.01	14	3	17
Other parties with <4% of vote	-	0	23	23
Independents	-	0	117	117
Totals		225	220	445

Source: Central Election Committee of Ukraine, http://www.cvk.gov.ua/pls/vd2002/webproc0v?kodvib=1&rejim=0

Table 19 Results of the 2002 Parliamentary Elections

Party	% PR vote	PR seats	SMD seats	Totals
Our Ukraine[i]	23.57	70	42	112
Communist Party of Ukraine	19.98	59	7	66
For United Ukraine[ii]	11.77	35	66	101
Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc[iii]	7.26	22	0	22
Socialist Party of Ukraine	6.87	20	3	23
United Social Democratic Party of Ukraine	6.27	19	5	24
Other parties with <4% of vote	-	0	8	8
Independents	-	0	94	94
Totals		225	225	450

Source: Central Election Committee of Ukraine, http://www.cvk.gov.ua/pls/vd2002/webproc0v?kodvib=400&rejim=0

Table 2 Notes:

[i] Viktor Yushchenko Bloc "Our Ukraine": Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists, Youth Party of Ukraine, People's Movement of Ukraine, Party of Christian-Popular Union, Reform and Order Party, Solidarity, Ukrainian People's Movement, Forward Ukraine!

[ii] For United Ukraine: Party of Regions, Agrarian Party of Ukraine, Party of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs of Ukraine, People's Democratic Party, Labour Ukraine

[iii] Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc: All-Ukrainian Union "Fatherland", Ukrainian People's Party Assembly, Ukrainian Republican Party, Ukrainian Social Democratic Party

Table 20 Results of the 2006 Parliamentary Elections

Party	% PR vote	PR seats
Party of Regions	32.14	186
Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc[i]	22.29	129
Our Ukraine Bloc[ii]	13.95	81
Socialist Party of Ukraine	5.69	33
Communist Party of Ukraine	3.66	21
Totals		450

Source: Central Election Committee of Ukraine, http://www.cvk.gov.ua/pls/vnd2006/w6p001

Table 3 Notes:
[i] Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc: All-Ukrainian United "Fatherland", Ukrainian Social Democratic Party
[ii] Our Ukraine Bloc: People's Union Our Ukraine, Party of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs of Ukraine, Christian Democratic Union, Ukrainian Republican Party Assembly, Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists

Table 21 Results of the 2007 Parliamentary Elections

Party	% PR vote	PR seats
Party of Regions	34.37	175
Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc[i]	30.71	156
Our Ukraine-People's Self-Defence Bloc[ii]	14.15	72
Communist Party of Ukraine	5.39	27
Lytvyn Bloc[iii]	3.96	20
Totals		

Source: Central Election Committee of Ukraine, http://www.cvk.gov.ua/pls/vnd2007/w6p001

Table 4 Notes:
[i] Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc: All-Ukrainian United "Fatherland", Ukrainian Social Democratic Party, Reforms and Order Party
[ii] Our Ukraine-People's Self-Defence Bloc: People's Union "Our Ukraine", Forward, Ukraine!, People's Movement of Ukraine, Ukrainian People's Party, Ukrainian Republican Party Assembly, Christian Democratic Union, European Party of Ukraine, Citizen's Party "PORA", Motherland Defenders Party
[iii] Lytvyn Bloc: People's Party, Labour Party of Ukraine

Appendix II: Glossary of Party Names and Acronyms

BL *Blok Lytvyn*, Lytvyn Bloc

BYuT *Blok Yulii Timoshenko-Baktivshchyna*, Yulia Tymoshenko-Baktivshchyna Bloc

KPU *Komunistychna Partiya Ukrayiny*, Communist Party of Ukraine

NUNS *Blok Nasha Ukrayina-Narodna Samooborona*, Our Ukraine-People's Self-Defence Bloc

PR *Partiya Regioniv*, Party of Regions

SPU *Sotsialistychna Partiya Ukrainy*, Socialist Party of Ukraine

Appendix III: Maps

Figure 1 Oblasts and capitals of Ukraine

Source: Sven Teschke/Wikipedia, distributed under the GNU Free Documentation licence

Figure 2 Ukraine's Donbas region


Source: Sven Teschke/Wikipedia, distributed under the GNU Free Documentation licence

Figure 3 Geographic regions of Ukraine

Source: Barrington & Farranda, 2009, p. 250

Appendix IV: Research Design

Twenty political elites, representing the leadership of the six parties who have obtained seats in the Verkhovna Rada since 2006, responded to surveys for this study, although 87 were contacted. The breakdown of responses by party is as follows:

Party	**Number of subjects**	**Per cent of total**
Party of Regions	4	20%
BYuT	4	20
NUNS	5	25
SPU	3	15
KPU	2	10
Bloc Lytvyn	2	10
Total	20	100

As can be seen from the breakdown, leaders from larger parties were more likely to respond. Among the individuals approached for the survey, they were either in the top five on the party lists, the party leader, first deputy, parliamentarian leader, or had served as a representative of their party in a cabinet from 2006 onwards.

The Survey

The survey used was drawn from Bueno de Mesquita's similar survey, reusing many of the questions and altering others to fit with the Ukrainian context (1975, pp. 164-166). It begins with a number of general questions regarding the overall goals and experiences of the respondent's party, followed by questions about their specific experiences with coalitions. After this, the respondent was asked about his/her responses to a number of hypothetical situations. Finally, the responded was asked several background questions.

The survey questions were translated from English into Russian by myself, and into Ukrainian with the assistance of a friend who is a native speaker. Respondents were given a choice of completing the questions in English, Ukrainian, or Russian; two chose Russian, and 18 chose Ukrainian. Respondents were sent links via email, which allowed them to respond to the survey

anonymously, although their responses were tagged with their political party. I as the researcher do not know which potential respondents actually replied.

Initially making contact with the political elites proved somewhat difficult, as my budget did not permit me to spend an extended amount of time in Ukraine to establish relationships. However, a friend who was an employee of the US Department of State put me in touch with a deputy who was willing to assist me in contacting party elites. The responses received were generally extremely thoughtful, well-composed, and enlightening.

Appendix V: The Survey Questionnaire

Questions marked with an x in the asterisk (*) column were used in the coding of the need for achievement; questions marked by an x in the hash sign (#) column were used in the coding of strategic predispositions. The survey proceeded as follows:

(English) Hello. This survey will ask you to answer questions about your experiences as a member of the Verkhovna Rada. It should take 20-30 minutes to complete. Please answer as best you can. Thank you for your participation.

(Russian) Здравствуйте. В этом вопросе, речь будет идти о Вашем опыте в Верховной раде. Опрос будет занимать около 20-30 минут. Пожалуйста, постарайтесь ответить тщательно на все вопросы. Спасибо большое за участие.

(Ukrainian) Вітаю. У цьому опитуванні буде йти мова про Ваш досвід у Верховні Раді. Це опитування не займе більше ніж 20-30 хвилин. Прошу ретельно відповідати на питання. Дуже вдячна за участь.

	*	#	
1	x		(English) What are the most important objectives that your party has for 2012? Any others?
			(Russian) Какие важные цели запланировала Ваша партия в 2012-ом году? Есть ещё какие-нибудь?
			(Ukrainian) Які найважливіші цілі Ваша партія поставила перед собою у 2012 році? Ще якісь?
2	x		How do you think coalitions affect the public image and political influence of your party?
			Как на Ваше мнение, коалиции влияют на публичную репутацию и политическое влияние Вашей партии?
			Як, на Вашу думку, коаліції впливають на публічний імідж та політичний вплив Вашої партії?
3			How do you think coalitions have affected the public image and political influence of your coalition partners?
			Как вы считаете, коалиции повлияли на публичную репутацию и политическое влияние других партий в Вашей коалиции?
			Як, на Вашу думку, коаліції вплинули на публічний імідж та політичний вплив

			партій-партнерів Вашої коаліції?
4			What criteria do you use in deciding on the party or legislators with whom you coalesce?
			Какие критерии Вы используете, когда Вы решаете с какими партиями и законодателями делать коалицию?
			Які критерії Ви вживаєте, коли приймаєте рішення з якими партіями та законодавцями вступати в коаліцію?
5			Are there any parties with which your party would not even consider a coalition? Why?
			Есть партия или партии, с которыми ваша партия никогда не будет вступать в коалицию? Почему?
			Чи існують партії, з якими Ваша партія навіть не буде розглядати створення коаліції? Чому?
6			Which parties would you least want to coalesce with? Which next?...Finally?
			С какими партиями Вы хотели бы менее всего вступать в коалицию? Еще?
			З якими партіями найменш всього Ви б хотіли створювати коаліцію? А ще?
7			Does your party usually wait to be offered a coalition, or does it sometimes initiate the negotiations itself? Why?
			Обычно ждёт ли Ваша партия, чтобы получить приглашение в коалицию, или Ваша партия сама когда-то инициировала переговоры?
			Чи зазвичай Ваша партія чекає на запрошення до коаліції, чи ж сама інколи ініціює переговори? Чому?
8	x		Do you think that there are any advantages to initiating negotiations? What are the advantages?
			Как вы думаете, есть ли преимущества когда Ваша партия (а не другая партия) начинает переговоры? Какие именно?
			Чи, на Вашу думку, існують якісь переваги, коли Ваша партія розпочинає переговори? Які саме переваги?
9			In negotiating a coalition, what are you most likely to discuss first? Then what? Any other things?
			Когда вы договариваетесь о коалиции, что Вы обсуждаете в начале? Позже?
			Під час переговорів про коаліцію, які питання, найвірогідніше, Ви обговорюєте на початку? Пізніше?
10			What factors have most commonly caused coalition negotiations with your party to fail? Why?
			Какие факторы послужили причиной к неудачи переговоров о коалиции с Вашей партией? Почему?
			Які фактори призвели до припинення переговорів про коаліцію з Вашою партією? Чому саме?
11		x	In the give and take of forming a coalition, what are the things your party is most likely to make concessions on? Why?
			Во время переговоров о создании коалиции, по каких вопросах Ваша партия готова пойти на уступки?
			У процесі формування коаліції, по яких питаннях Ваша партія може уступити?
12		x	What other things has your party conceded?
			По каких других вопросах Ваша партия пошла на уступки?
			На які ще спірні питання Ваша партія уступила?
13		x	In which areas is the party least willing to make concessions? Why?
			По каких вопросах Ваша партия меньше всего готова пойти на уступки?
			Які питання Ваша партія менше всього готова уступити? Чому?
14		x	What other things has your party refused to concede?
			По какие других вопросах Ваша партия отказалась пойти на уступки?

			На які інші спірні питання Ваша партія відмовилася іти на уступки?
15		x	If in the midst of a coalition, some party or group of parties offered your party a more accommodating alliance, would you accept it? Why?
			Если б партия или группа партий предложили Вашей партии более выгодной союз, вы приняли бы? Почему?
			Якщо б інша партія або ж група партій запропонували більш вигідні умови Вашій партії, чи Ви б прийняли? Чому?
16	x	x	Would you rather win a legislative victory that would lead to the breakup of a coalition your party was in, or would you rather have the coalition remain intact and not win the victory? Why?
			Вы бы предпочитали законодательную победу, которая бы привела к дезинтеграции Вашей коалиции, или Вы бы предпочитали, чтобы коалиция осталась, но, в этом случае, Ваша партия не победила бы? Почему?
			Яким би був Ваш вибір: Ви б хотіли виграти законодавчу сутичку, але б Ваша коаліція розпалася? Чи для Вас було б пріорітетнішим зберегти коаліцію, але програти сутичку? Прошу обгрунтувати Вашу відповідь.
17	x		Of course being in the government gives you the opportunity to distribute patronage. What effect has this had on the relations between the party's leaders and its rank and file membership?
			Работая в государстве, у Вас появляется возможность распределять патронаж. Как это повлияло на отношения между лидерами партии и рядовыми членами?
			Будучи членом управління, Ви отримуєте можливість розприділяти патронаж. Як це вплинуло на відносини між верхівкою партії та звичайними членами партії?
18	x		Do you think that the distribution of patronage can be an effective tool for improving the party's electoral appeal? How?
			На Ваше мнение, распределение патронажа может ли быть эффективным инструментом для улучшения привлекательности партии во время выборов?
			На Вашу думку, чи може бути розподіл патронажу ефективним інструментом для покращення іміджу партії під час виборів? Чому?
19	x		Can patronage improve the party's legislative effectiveness? How?
			Как Вы считаете, или шефство может улучшить законодательную эффективность партии? Как?
			На вашу думку, патронаж може покращити законодавчу ефективність партії? Яким чином?
20	x		In what ways do coalitions affect the organisation and cohesion of your party? Its discipline?
			Как коалиции могут влиять на организацию и единство вашей партии? И её дисциплинированность?
			Яким чином коаліції можуть вплинути на організаційний лад і єдність Вашої партії? Та її дисциплінованість?
21			Does your party's national leadership generally make coalition decisions? Why?
			Обычно ли партийное национальное руководство принимает коалицыонное решение? Почему?
			Чи Ваша партійна верхівка приймає коаліційні рішення? Чому?
22			Are decisions about pre-election alliances made first at the district, state, or national level? Why?
			На каком уровне решения делается о предвыборных блоках: на местном, областном, или национальном уровнях?
			На якому рівні приймаються рішення про передвиборчі блоки: на міському, обласному чи національному?

23	x		What has your party gained from joining coalitions?
			Что Ваша партия выиграли из вступа в коалиции?
			Як Ваша партія виграла від того, що приєдналася до коаліцій?
24			What has it lost?
			Что Ваша партия потеряли из вступа в коалиции?
			Що Ваша партія втратила від вступу у коаліції?
25			Would your party have gained more by not joining?
			Как Вы считаете, или Ваша партия добилась бы много, если она не вступили бы в коалиции?
			На Вашу думку, Ваша партія добилася б багато, не вступаючи у коаліції?
26			In your experience, did the bigger or smaller parties in the coalition gain more? Why?
			По Вашему опыту, кто в коалиции выигрывает больше: большие партии или маленькие партии?
			По Вашому досвіду, хто в коаліції виграє більше – великі партії чи ж маленькі?
27	x		What did you originally expect to gain from the coalitions?
			Что Вы изначально ожидали получить от коалиций?
			Що Ви очікували отримати від коаліції?
28			How do you think your original expectations compare with your actual experience? Why?
			Как Ваши изначальные ожидание могут сравниться с Вашим реальным опытом? Почему?
			Як Ваші початкові очікування можуть зрівнятися із отриманим досвідом? Чому?
29	x	x	Does your party have a coalition strategy? What is it?
			У вашей партии есть коалиционная стратегия? Какая именно?
			Чи є у Вашої партії коаліційна стратегія? Яка саме?
30	x		Compared to coalitions, what are the advantages and disadvantages of pre-election alliances?
			Какие Вы считаете преимущества и неудобства у предвыборных блоков (по сравнению с коалициями)?
			Які, на Вашу думку, є переваги та недоліки у передвиборчих блоках (порівнюючи із коаліцією)?
31			Do you think that coalitions that are based on pre-election alliances are more successful? Why?
			Как Вы считаете, коалиции, которые основываются на предвыборных блоках, более удачные?
			На Вашу думку, коаліції, які засновуються на передвиборчих блоках, більш вдалі?
32	x		Do they cost more in the sense of limiting the spread of your party's organisation? Why?
			Как Вы считаете, предвыборные блоки ограничивают деятельность вашей партии более, чем коалиции? Почему?
			На Вашу думку, передвиборчі блоки обмежують обсяг дії Вашої партії більш ніж коаліції? Чому?
33	x		This is a very hypothetical situation and will never happen in Ukraine. Nevertheless, I am interested in your general attitude towards the problem. Let's say there were a legislature with one dominant party, several parties of approximately equal strength, and one or two weaker parties. If in that legislature, your party had 18% and the other parties had 30%, 20%, 15%, 11%, and 6% respectively, which of the following do you think would be the best coalition for your party: (a) 30, 20, 18 = 68% (b) 30, 18, 15 = 63% (c) 30, 18, 11 = 59% (d) 30, 18, 6 = 54% (e) 20, 18, 15 =

			53% (f) 20, 18, 11, 6 = 55%. Why would you prefer that one?
			Это очень предположительная ситуация, которая никогда не случится в Украине. Однако я интересуюсь вашей общей позицией по этому вопросу. Допустим, что законодательная власть состоялась из одной главенствующей партией, несколько партий с одинаковой силой, и одной или двумя слабыми партиями. Если у Вашей партии есть 18% мест, а у других партий есть 30%, 20%, 15%, 11%, и 6% соответственно, какую коалицию Вы бы предпочитали для Вашей партии: (a) 30, 20, 18 = 68% (b) 30, 18, 15 = 63% (c) 30, 18, 11 = 59% (d) 30, 18, 6 = 54% (e) 20, 18, 15 = 53% (f) 20, 18, 11, 6 = 55%. Почему?
			Це гіпотетична ситуація, яка ніколи не виникне на Україні. Тим не менше, мене цікавить Ваша думка по цьому питанні. Допустимо, що законодавча гілка влади складається із домінантної партії, декількох партій з одинаковою владою, та з одної або двох слабших партій. Якщо у Вашої партії є 18 % місць, а у інших 30%, 20%, 15%, 11% та 6% відповідно, якій коаліції Ви б надали перевагу: (a) 30,20, 18=68%, (b) 30, 18, 15 = 63% (c) 30, 18, 11 = 59% (d) 30, 18, 6 = 54% (e) 20, 18, 15 = 53% (f) 20, 18, 11, 6 = 55%. Чому?
34	x		Why would you prefer that one? (33)
			Почему Вы бы предпочитали? (33)
			Чому Ви б надали перевагу? (33)
35			How do you accommodate newcomers to your coalition?
			Как вы приспосабливаете новоприбывших к вашей коалиции?
			Як Ви приспособлюєте новоприбульців до Вашої коаліції?
36			When did you first become interested in politics? Why?
			Когда сначала вы стали интересоваться политикой? Почему?
			Коли Ви зацікавилися політикою вперше? Чому?
37			Have any other members of your family ever been active in politics?
			Другие члены вашей семьи когда-нибудь интересовались политикой?
			Інші члени Вашої сім'ї коли-небудь цікавилися політикою?
38			Besides politics, what is your occupation?
			Кроме политики, какая у вас профессия?
			Окрім поітики, яка у Вас професія?
39			How much formal education have you had? (secondary school, university, graduate, post-graduate)
			Ваше образование (сродное высшее, неполное высшее, базовое высшее, полное высшее, последипломное)?
			Ваша освіта (середнє вище, неповне вище, базове вище, повне вище, післядипломне)?
40			Have you ever belonged to any other political party since 1998? Which?
			Принадлежали Вы когда-нибудь к другим партиям после 1998-ого года? К каким именно?
			Чи Ви після 1998-ого року були членом іншої партії? До котрої саме?
41			What were your parents' occupations?
			Какие профессии были у Ваших родителей?
			Хто за професією були Ваші батьки?
42			Are you from an urban, suburban, or rural constituency?
			Вы из какого округа? (городского, пригородного, сельского)
			Звідки Ви походите? (з одиниці міського, напівміського, напівселищного, селищного типу)?
43			How old are you?
			Сколько вам лет?
			Ваш вік?

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

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